American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2017

Tobacco, Denormalization, Anti-Healthism, and Health Justice
Lindsay Wiley
American University Washington College of Law, wiley@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Wiley, Lindsay, "Tobacco, Denormalization, Anti-Healthism, and Health Justice" (2017). Articles in Law
Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 1163.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1163

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews &
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION, ANTIHEALTHISM, AND HEALTH JUSTICE
Lindsay F. Wiley*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
..........................................
204
II. STRATEGIES FOR TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION.................209
A. Tobacco Taxes........................210
B. Product Regulation..
.....................211
C. Advertising Restrictions..................... 214
D. Counter-Marketing ...........
........ 216
E. Warning Mandates ......................
218
F. Smoke-Free Laws...........................219
G. DiscriminationAgainst Tobacco Users....222
III. FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING TOBACCO
DENORMALIZATION
.........................
...... 223
A. Legal Protections..............
...... 224
B. LibertarianAnti-Healthism.....
...... 229
C. Health Justice ................
....... 233
D. EgalitarianAnti-Healthism...........
236
IV. ASSESSING TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION ......
....... 239
A. Tobacco Taxes ..
..................... 239
B. ProductRegulation
.................. 241
C. Counter-Marketing...................242
D. Advertising Restrictions..................... 244
E. Warning Mandates ............
........ 246
F. Smoke-Free Laws...............
..... 246
G. DiscriminationAgainst Tobacco Users....248
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
..................
........ 251

* Professor of Law, Director of the Health Law and Policy Program, American
University Washington College of Law.

203

204

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18.2

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1965, one year after Surgeon General Luther Terry
released a landmark report on the health hazards of smoking,'
more than 42% of American adults were current smokers. 2 In
2015, after a half-century of efforts to reduce tobacco use, that
number was down to just over 15%.3 Tobacco control is considered
to be among the greatest public health successes of the twentieth
century 4 but there is still much work to be done. Tobacco control
advocates warn that "[e]ach day, about 2,500 kids in the United
States try their first cigarette; and another 400 additional kids
under 18 years of age become new regular, daily smokers." 5 The
effects of nicotine addiction set in very quickly, with symptoms
"often occur[ing] only weeks or even just days after youth
'experimentation' with smoking first begins." 6 The majority of
tobacco users say they want to quit, but in addition to addiction,
many face barriers such as lack of social support and inadequate
7
access to cessation aids and counseling.

&

1. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Smoking and Health: Report of the
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, PUB. HEALTH
SERV. PUB. No. 1103, at 7-8 (1964), https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/nnbbmq.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PCH3-UMEH].
2. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., The Health Consequences of Smoking50 Years of Progress:A Report of the Surgeon General 720 (2014), https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RF2Z-T5KD].
3. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Current Cigarette Smoking Among
Adults-United States, 2005-2016, 65 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REP. 1205
(Nov. 11, 2016).
4. See, e.g., Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public
Health, 1900-1999: Tobacco Use-United States, 1990-1999, 48 MORBIDITY
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 986, 986-88 (Nov. 5, 1999).
5. Laura Bach, Smoking and Kids, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, (Jan.
12, 2017), (citing Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., Results from the
2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables Table 4.14A (Sept. 8,
https://www.samhsa.gov/datalsites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015/NSD
2016),
UH-DetTabs-2015/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015.pdf [https://perma.cclYYC5-CXJ8].
6. Bach, supra note 5, at 1 (citing Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Initial Symptoms of
Nicotine Dependence in Adolescents, TOBACCO CONTROL (Apr. 14, 2000), http://tobac[https://perma.cc/8XF7cocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/9/3/313.full.pdf
G7GX]).
7. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Quitting Smoking Among AdultsUnited States, 2001-2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1513, 1513, 151516,1518 (Nov. 11, 2011); U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Treating Tobacco Use
and Dependence: 2008 Update 2-3 (2008) (concluding that cessation services and aids
increase the odds of successful cessation), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK63952/; [https://perma.cc/8EDU-X2AF]; cf. D. Kotz et al., Explaining the
Social Gradient in Smoking Cessation: It's Not in the Trying, But in the Succeeding,
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The success of tobacco control is widely attributed to a
strategy referred to as denormalization.8
The strategic
association of negative social norms with tobacco companies,
products, use, and users is readily apparent in counter-marketing
campaigns that depict the industry as predatory and
manipulative, tobacco products as monstrously toxic, and tobacco
use as cosmetically and socially risky.9 Warnings about stained
teeth, wrinkled skin, bad breath, impotence, and loss of control
are highly visible,' 0 but law also plays an important role in
denormalization.
Laws regulating tobacco products and
advertising constrain industry efforts to make them appear
appealing, appropriate, and desirable, especially for young
teens."
Laws prohibiting smoking in bars, restaurants,
workplaces, and other public spaces serve multiple goals. They
protect bystanders from exposure to secondhand smoke, make
smoking less convenient for smokers, and make nonsmokers and
those who are trying to quit less likely to view smoking as a

TOBACCO
CONTROL
43,
46
(Oct.
20,
2008),
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/18/1/43.full
[https://perma.cc/2Y6A-3MGA]
(discussing socio-economic disparities in cessation success in England); Diana
Williams Stewart, Predictors of Social Support Provided to Smokers 3, 4 (2008)
(unpublished
M.A.
thesis,
Louisiana
State
University),
http://digitalcommons.1su.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1547&context=gradschool
theses [https://perma.cc/57VN-MD5B].
8. See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., A Model for Change: The California
Experience in Tobacco Control 3 (1998) ("The California Tobacco Control Program has
sought to . . . denormalize smoking and other tobacco use . . . Evaluation results

indicate that this approach is working in California: people are smoking less and more
people
are
protected
from
exposure
to
second-hand
smoke."),
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/tobaccolDocments/CDPH%20CTCP%20Refresh/
Policy/Social%20Norm%2OChange/CTCPmodelforchangel998.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/Y843-5NH3]; Sei-Hill Kim & James Shanahan, Stigmatizing Smokers: Public
Sentiment Toward Cigarette Smoking and its Relationshipto Smoking Behaviors, 8 J.
HEALTH CoMM. 343, 360 (2003) (finding "that smoking rates are lower in the states
where the public" sentiment toward smoking is more negative and "that smokers who
have experienced unfavorable public sentiment are more willing to quit smoking than

those who have not"); David Hammond et al., Tobacco Denormalizationand Industry
Beliefs Among Smokers from Four Countries, 31 AM. J. PREV. MED. 225, 229 (2006)
(finding that people who perceive high levels of social denormalization of tobacco use
are more likely to quit smoking); Benjamin Alamar & Stanton A. Glantz, Effect of
Increased Social Unacceptability of Cigarette Smoking on Reduction in Cigarette
Consumption, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1359, 1362 (2006) (finding that states where
smoking is socially unacceptable have lower rates of smoking and concluding that
"[t]obacco control programs should ... reinforce the nonsmoking norm").
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part H.A-B.
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normal part of adult life.1 2 Lawmakers sometimes argue that
allowing or encouraging employers, insurers, and landlords to
discriminate against tobacco users will prompt users to quit and
discourage others from starting.13
Tobacco denormalization has generated significant litigation
over the scope of government authority to regulate tobacco
manufacturers, sellers, users, and other parties (e.g., employers,
Existing constitutional
health insurers, and landlords). 14
to constrain tobacco
do
little
protections
statutory
and
precedents
protections for
of
speech
denormalization. Constitutional freedom
tobacco companies, which impose the only firm limit on tobacco
control in the United States, create perverse incentives for
regulators.15 Statutory protections for tobacco users vary from
state to state and are inadequate to address social exclusion, bias,
and many forms of overt discrimination. 16 Open questions
remain, however, that will shape tobacco denormalization efforts
in the future.17
Tobacco denormalization also raises ethical and political
questions that scholars, policymakers, and consumer advocates
have debated for more than a decade.'s Is it legitimate for the
state to promote abstinence from tobacco use as part of a
particular conception of the good life? Even if discouraging
tobacco use is an acceptable goal, is it acceptable for government
to encourage social exclusion and discrimination against tobacco
users? Even if denormalization was appropriate at a time when
a large proportion of the population used tobacco, should it be
reevaluated in light of the potential effect of anti-tobacco bias on
the socially disadvantaged groups who are more likely to be
current smokers? Are the negative effects of denormalization on
tobacco users who are unable or unwilling to quit (e.g., loss of

&

12. See infra Part II.E.
13. See infra Part II.F.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J. L. MED.
ETHICS 179, 187 (2002) [hereinafter Burris (2002)]; Scott Burris, Stigma and the Law,
367 THE LANCET 529, 529-30 (2006) [hereinafter Burris (2006)]; Scott Burris, Stigma,
Ethics and Policy: A Commentary on Bayer's "Stigma and the Ethics of Public Health:
Not Can We but Should We?, 67 J. Soc. SC. & MED. 473, 475 (2008) [hereinafter Burris
(2008)]; Kim & Shanahan, supra note 8, at 343; Tamar M.J. Antin et al., Tobacco
Denormalization as a Public Health Strategy: Implications for Sexual and Gender
Minorities, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2426, 2426 (2015).
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social status, employment, insurance, or housing) outweighed by
the positive effects for former users (who are encouraged to quit)
and non-users (who are protected from secondhand smoke and
influenced by social norms that make it less likely they will take
up tobacco use themselves)? Extralegal frameworks based on
liberal, libertarian, utilitarian, egalitarian, and communitarian
notions of justice provide varying answers to these questions. In
turn, these answers may inform lawmakers as they consider
reform proposals and judges and regulators as they consider
questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation raised by
tobacco denormalization.
Critics sometimes use a harsher term, stigmatization, to
describe the intentional use of social disapproval to influence
tobacco use. 19 Choice of this term conveys skepticism about the
acceptability of tobacco denormalization. Indeed, public health
ethicists and legal scholars debate whether the bias, social
exclusion, and discrimination experienced by tobacco users
amounts to true stigma. In the view of some critics, a "stigma's
decentralized and visceral mode of social control" renders its
intentional use as a public health tool flatly unethical. 20 True
stigmatization of a health condition (e.g., HIV), health-related
behavior (e.g., injection drug use), or status (e.g., men who have
sex with men) is a detriment to health at the individual and
population level. 2 1 It calls for a very different public health
strategy, destigmatization, which aims to protect individuals from

&

19. See, e.g., Kirsten Bell et al., Smoking, Stigma and Tobacco 'Denormalization':
Further Reflections on the Use of Stigma as a Public Health Tool. A Commentary on
Social Science & Medicine's Stigma, Prejudice, Discriminationand Health Special
Issue (67:3), 70 Soc. Sc. & MED. 795, 795-96 (2010); Kirsten Bell et al., 'Every Space
is Claimed: Smokers' Experiences of Tobacco Denormalisation, 32 Soc. HEALTH
914,
922
(2010),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467ILLNESS
9566.2010.01251.x/pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYC2-S6XJ].
20. Burris (2008), supra note 18.
21. See, e.g., World Summit of Ministers of Health, London Declarationon AIDS
Preventions, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 2 (Jan. 28, 1988), http://apps.who.int/iris/bit[https://perma.ccY7XD-8JL4]
stream/10665/60718/1/WHOGPAINF_88.6.pdf
("Discrimination against, and stigmatization of, HIV-infected people and people with
AIDS and population groups undermine public health and must be avoided."); Ronald
Bayer & Jennifer Stuber, Tobacco Control, Stigma and Public Health: Rethinking the
Relations, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 47, 48 (2006) (noting that in a 1987 address to the
United Nations General Assembly, Jonathan Mann, director of the World Health
Organization's Global Program on AIDS, "underscored the significance of
stigmatization and the social and political unwillingness to face the epidemic as being
'as central to the global AIDS challenge as the disease itself"'); (citing Richard Parker
& Peter Aggleton, HIV and AIDS-Related stigma and discrimination; a conceptual
framework and implications for action, 57 SOc. Sdl. & MED. 13, 13 (2003)).
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stigma through privacy and antidiscrimination protections. 22
In their groundbreaking work on healthism, Jessica Roberts
23
and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard have waded into this debate.
Although their focus is on health-status discrimination more
broadly, they frequently discuss tobacco control strategies as
examples. They point to employer "bans on hiring nicotine users"
(as distinguished from bans on smoking in the workplace) as
"paradigmatic healthist conduct." 24 On the other hand, they
smoking-cessation
employee
"participation-based,
argue,
programs" are "an easy case of a non-healthist policy that
discriminates based on health status. 25 Their framework for
distinguishing between the two (and between other forms of
"'good' and 'bad' health-status differentiations" 26) relies on several
factors, including whether the differentiation "[i]s driven by
animus," and whether it "[s]tigmatizes individuals unfairly,
[p]unishes people for their private conduct, [i]mpedes access to
health care, [c]uts off resources or otherwise limits the ability to
adopt healthy life choices, [p]roduces worse health outcomes, or
27
[m]aintains or increases existing disparities."
In this commentary, I demarcate the value added by the
Roberts and Leonard anti-healthism framework by comparing it
to alternative frameworks for assessing the legal, ethical, and
political issues raised by tobacco denormalization. In Part II, I
current and potential tobacco denormalization
describe
strategies. In Part III, I introduce four frameworks for assessing
tobacco denormalization strategies: (1) constitutional doctrines
and statutes that secure the liberty of tobacco manufacturers,

22. See Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care: Lessons from HIV
Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV. 831, 835-36 (1998) (describing the destigmatization strategy
for HIV as entailing the adoption of new legal frameworks "to protect people with HIV
from discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations; . . . to
protect HIV-related medical information; and .. . [to] protect medical privacy and limit
coercive legal
HIV testing in the absence of informed consent" and "opposition to ...
measures, such as mandatory testing and a whole range of criminal laws directed at

conduct that was thought to contribute to the spread of the disease").
23. See Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism": A Critique of the Antidiscrimination
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-CareReform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159
(2012) [hereinafter Roberts (2012)]; Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of
Employment Discrimination,99 IOWA L. REV. 571 (2014) [hereinafter Roberts (2014)];
Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What is (and isn't) Healthism?, 50 GA.
L. REV. 833 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts & Leonard (2016)].
24. Roberts & Leonard (2016), supra note 23, at 846, 896.
25. Id. at 900.
26. Id. at 896.
27. Id. at 895.
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retailers, and users and protect them from discrimination; (2) the
healthjustice framework I have developed to assess the use of law
as a tool for reducing health disparities; (3) a critique advanced
by Petr Skrabanek 28 and others, which I will call libertarianantihealthism; and (4) the alternative vision of anti-healthism
developed by Roberts and Leonard, which I will call egalitarian
anti-healthism. In Part IV, I compare the four frameworks
described in Part III by applying them to each of the
denormalization strategies described in Part II. In Part V, I offer
concluding reflections on the value added by the Roberts and
Leonard framework and some suggestions for their ongoing development of anti-healthism as a principle for assessing health care
and public health policy.
II. STRATEGIES FOR TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION
Before assessing the legal, ethical, and political issues raised
by various tobacco denormalization strategies, it is important to
develop a common understanding about what denormalization is
and a taxonomy of the various forms it may take. The traditional
epidemiological model of agent, host, vector, and environment 29
offers a useful starting point. According to this model, patterns of
tobacco-related disease are produced by the interaction of a host
(a consumer of tobacco products, potential consumer, or
bystander) with the agent of disease (tobacco products and smoke)
within an environment (which is shaped by social, cultural,
economic, and legal factors).30 In this model, tobacco companies
and their business practices act as the vectors of disease,
spreading propaganda and misinformation in an effort to hook
new consumers. 31 Young teenagers are the target demographicfor industry and public health officials alike. Virtually all tobacco
users initiate their tobacco use and become regular users in their
teen years. 32 Accordingly, a person who does not start tobacco use

28. See PETR SKRABANEK, THE DEATH OF HUMANE MEDICINE AND THE RISE OF

COERCIVE HEALTHISM (1994) [hereinafter Skrabanek (1994)].
29. LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 19 (5th ed. 2014).
30. C. TRACY ORLEANS & JOHN SLADE, NICOTINE ADDICTION: PRINCIPLES AND
MANAGEMENT ix (1993).
31. Dirk Hanson, The Tobacco Industry as Disease Vector, ADDICTION INBOX 2

(May 26, 2012), http://addiction-dirkh.blogspot.com/2012/05/tobacco-industry-as-disease-vector.html [https://perma.cc/K95B-YE76].
32. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.'s, Substance Abuse & Mental Health
Administration, National Survey on Drug Use & Health 2014 (2014),
http://www.icpsr.umich.edulicpsrweblNAHDAP/studies/36361/version/1
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prior to adulthood is unlikely to ever take it up. 33
Denormalization alters the social environment in which
consumers and potential consumers make choices about tobacco
Here, I will focus on seven types of tobacco control
use.
interventions that influence social norms: (1) taxes that increase
the cost of tobacco products; (2) regulations that targets tobacco
products as the agent of disease; (3) marketing restrictions that
target tobacco companies as vectors; (4) counter-marketing
campaigns sponsored by government and nongovernmental
organizations; (5) laws requiring tobacco companies and retailers
to display warnings on product packaging, advertisements, or at
the point of sale; (6) smoke-free laws prohibiting users from
smoking in particular locations; and (7) laws permitting,
encouraging, or requiring discrimination against tobacco users. It
is important to emphasize that policymakers and public health
officials have adopted many of these interventions without
explicitly intending to denormalize tobacco. 34 Indeed, each of the
interventions discussed here serves other purposes beyond
denormalizing tobacco companies, use, and users. For some of
them, the effect on social norms is incidental to other effects, such
as increasing the economic cost of tobacco.
A. Tobacco Taxes
Federal, state, and local taxes on tobacco products reduce
consumption significantly, especially among teenagers and young
adults. 35 In 2009, for example, when Congress raised the federal
tax on cigarettes after a long period of stagnation, researchers
documented an immediate impact on teen smoking. One month
after the tax went into effect, "the percentage of middle and high

&

[https://perma.ccH9SW-3WLW]; See U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Preventing
Tobacco Use Among Youth and Young Adults: A Report of the Surgeon General 101
https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/preventing-youth-tobacco(2012),
use/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG69-E9EE].
33. Dennis Thompson, Jr., Teens and Smoking, EVERYDAY HEALTH (July 13,
2011),
http://www.everydayhealth.com/smoking-cessation/understanding/smokingand-teens.aspx [https://perma.cc/X8SD-PSGC].
34. As Ronald Bayer has described, "those who smoked [became] targets of public
health policies that at first inadvertently but then explicitly sought to utilize the power
of denormalization and marginalization to reduce tobacco consumption." Ronald
Bayer, Stigma and the Ethics of Public Health: Not Can We But Should We, 67 SoC.
SCI. & MED. 463, 466 (2008) (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Frank J. Chaloupka, Macro-Social Influences: The Effects of Prices
and Tobacco Control Policies on the Demand for Tobacco Products, 1 NICOTINE
TOBACCO RES. S105, S105-07 (1999).
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school students who reported smoking in the [previous] thirty
days [had] dropped by 10 percent, . . . resulting in a quarter of a
million fewer . . . smokers[.]" 36 The current federal tax on
cigarettes is $1.01 per pack. 37 State taxes vary considerably
depending on political preferences about taxation and the
influence of the tobacco industry, ranging from $4.35 per pack in
New York to $0.30 per pack in Virginia. 38 "[M]ore than 600 local
jurisdictions" also tax cigarettes. 39 These taxes are cumulative.
For example, the combined federal, state, county, and city taxes
amount to $7.17 per pack in Chicago. 40
So called "sin taxes" increase the financial cost of targeted
goods and services, while also signaling social disapproval. 4
Other excise taxes may have a more direct effect on social norms.
Taxes on disposable shopping bags, for example, are applied at
check-out in a way that is highly visible to the consumer and
others who might be watching. 42 Still, even tobacco taxes applied
in more subtle ways send a social signal. 43 Bruce Carruthers has
argued that taxation of "[1]egal but morally problematic" goods
and services and earmarking of funds for "'motherhood and apple
pie'" projects like tobacco education can project "negative social
meanings" associated with disfavored market activity. 44

B. Product Regulation
Surprisingly few measures target tobacco products as agents
of disease. Flavor bans, such as the 2009 Tobacco Control Act's
36. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER,

DuTY, RESTRAINT 278 (3d ed. 2015) (citing Jidong Huang & Frank J. Chaloupka, The
Impact of the 2009 Federal Tobacco Excise Tax Increase on Youth Tobacco Use, NAT'L
BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Working Paper No. 18026, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18026.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9WT-ZCEX]).
37. Ann Boonn, Top Combined State-Local Cigarette Tax Rates, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0267.pdf [https://perma.cclUTH3-UYQRI.
38. Ann Boonn, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact-

sheets/pdfl0097.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KZT-ANQH].
39. Boonn, supra note 38.

40. Id.
41. Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax: Politics, Morality, and Fiscal
Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565-66 (2016) (arguing that "negative social
meanings can be projected through public revenue systems").
42. GOsTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 277 (discussing potential lessons of the
social impact of bag taxes for public health taxes).
43. Carruthers, supra note 41, at 2565-66.
44. Id.
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prohibition on flavored cigarettes, 45 and state and local laws that
prohibit additional flavors and products, 46 are a notable
exception. Flavor bans are not aimed at rendering the agent less
toxic. Indeed, menthol, the one flavoring that research suggests
48
is
may render tobacco products more lethal 47 and addictive
49
Prohibiting fruit and
currently exempted from the federal ban.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012) ("[A] cigarette or any of its component parts
(including the tobacco, filter, or paper) shall not contain, as a constituent (including a
smoke constituent) or additive, an artificial or natural flavor (other than tobacco or
menthol) or an herb or spice, including strawberry, grape, orange, clove, cinnamon,
pineapple, vanilla, coconut, licorice, cocoa, chocolate, cherry, or coffee, that is a
characterizing flavor of the tobacco product or tobacco smoke. Nothing in this
subparagraph shall be construed to limit the Secretary's authority to take action under
this section or other sections of this chapter applicable to menthol or any artificial or
natural flavor, herb, or spice not specified in this subparagraph."); At least some
flavored tobacco products were previously prohibited under the Master Settlement
Agreement, in which tobacco companies agreed that they would not market their
products to youth, and under state and local laws in a few jurisdictions. See Mitchell
Hamline School of Law, Public Health Law Center, Flavored Products, PUB. HEALTH
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-controllsales-re1-2,
CTR.
L.
strictions/flavored-products [https://perma.cclUTD7-EMPU].
46. Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Public Health Law Center, Regulating
Flavored Tobacco Products, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR. 1-2, (describing state and local
restrictions on flavored tobacco products). http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/de[https://perma.cc/
fault/files/resources/tclc-guide-regflavoredtobaccoprods-2014.pdf
C9R7-ESRP]
47. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Tobacco Prod. Sci. Advisory Committee,
Menthol Cigarettes and Public Health: Review of the Scientific Evidence and
Recommendations 191, 206, 210, 217-18, (2011) (reviewing scientific evidence
regarding disease risks associated with menthol versus non-menthol cigarettes and
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory
inconclusive),
evidence
the
finding
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/TobaccoProductsScientificAdvisory
Committee/ UCM269697.pdf [https://perma.cclP7CL-GVJ2].
48. Id. at 225-26 (reviewing scientific evidence regarding the physiological effects
of menthol cigarettes and finding sufficient evidence "to conclude that menthol has
cooling and anesthetic effects that reduce the harshness of cigarette smoke" and "that
it is biologically plausible that menthol makes cigarette smoking more addictive").
49. FlavoredProducts, supra note 45, at 1. In 2011, a report by FDA's Tobacco
Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC) found that while menthol cigarettes
are no more toxic than unflavored cigarettes the anesthetic properties of menthol
"could increase prevalence [of smoking] by increasing the rate of initiation and
subsequent addiction and by more strongly maintaining addiction and reducing
successful cessation." U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supranote 47, at 3, 25. In 2013, FDA
issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit input on regulating
menthol cigarettes. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol
in Cigarettes 1, (July 23, 2013) http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/ucm361966.htm [https://perma.cc/84EG-GC7T]. FDA regulation was
delayed, however, by litigation initiated by tobacco companies alleging that the TPSAC
report was invalid due to conflicts of interest. In 2016, the D.C. Court of Appeals held
that the FDA was permitted to rely on the TPSAC report. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:11-cv-00440 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As of this writing,
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candy flavorings does, however, render tobacco products less
attractive to children and other potential new users.50
The link between flavor bans and social norms is perhaps
somewhat attenuated, but in addition to making tobacco products
less appealing to children, flavor bans limit industry efforts to
configure tobacco products in ways that suggest they are
appropriatefor children. Tobacco companies intentionally design
flavored products to be "obviously youth oriented" in the words of
an internal RJ Reynolds memo from 1974.51 'This could involve
cigarette name, blend, flavor and marketing technique . . . . For
example, a flavor which would be candy-like but give the
satisfaction of a cigarette."' 52 As intended, the idea that flavored
products are socially appropriate for kids and teens has caught on
among tobacco users.
For example, "[a] Lorillard report
summarizing the test results from new cigarette flavors, included
smokers' description of 'Tutti Frutti' flavored cigarettes as 'for
younger people, beginner cigarette smokers, teenagers . . . when
you feel like a light smoke, want to be reminded of bubblegum.' 5 3
Bans on non-menthol flavorings for cigarettes are an
important starting point for reducing youth smoking initiation. 54
However, they leave many candy-flavored tobacco products on the
market, in addition to menthol cigarettes (an issue I'll return to
the FDA has not issued a proposed rule banning menthol. In 2013, Chicago became
the first jurisdiction to ban the sale of all flavors, including menthol. The ban survived
constitutional
challenges by tobacco retailers; Menthol in Cigarettes, Tobacco Products; Request for
Comments, 78 Fed. Reg. 44484 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
1140); Pub. Health L. Ctr., Chicago's Regulation of Menthol Flavored Tobacco Products:
A Case Study, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, http://www.publichealthlaw-

center.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-casestudy-chicago-menthol-2015_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AZF2-45JS]. (last visited Mar. 31, 2017); 76 Enter., Inc. v. City of
Chicago, No. 1:14-cv-08306, at 2-4 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass'ns.,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 112 F. Supp. 3d 749, 751-52, 754, 756-58 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see
Michael Freiberg, The Minty Taste of Death: State and Local Options to Regulate
Menthol in Tobacco Products, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 949, 973-74 (2015).
50. See, e.g., G. Ferris Wayne & G. N. Connolly, How CigaretteDesign CanAffect
Youth Initiation into Smoking: Camel Cigarettes 1983-93, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i32
(2002),
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/l1/suppl_1/i32.long
i35,
i37-i38
[https://perma.cc/753C-9LXH].
51. Laura Bach, Flavored Tobacco Products Attract Kids, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACcO-FREE KIDS 5 (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact-

sheets/pdf/0383.pdf [https://perma.cc/284Y-9VBV].
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting R.M. Manko Associates, Summary Report: New Flavors Focus
https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edulpdf
Group
Sessions
(1978),
[https://perma.cc/4C66-DJ8F]).
54. See, e.g., Wayne & Connolly, supra note 50, at i33, i35, i37-i38.
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in Part III.A). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has,
thus far, declined to prohibit candy-flavored smokeless tobacco
(e.g., chewing tobacco and snus) or liquids for use in electronic
cigarettes, (also known as e-cigarettes) and water pipes (also
known as hookas). Research suggests that the ubiquity of flavors
designed to appeal to youth is contributing to the dramatic
increase in e-cigarette and hooka use among children, teens, and
young adults.5 5
C. Advertising Restrictions
Drawing on 'vector analysis' which first emphasized tobacco
industry activities, rather than smokers' individual behaviors, as
critical for tobacco control,"5 6 denormalization emerged in direct
response to industry marketing strategies that promote tobacco
products as part of a socially desirable lifestyle.57 For more than
a century, tobacco companies have used colorful package inserts
and advertisements to associate their products with sports stars
and other celebrities.5 8 Tobacco companies sponsor sports and
59
entertainment events to "reinforce the imagery of the brand."

Marketing campaigns target particular demographic groupsespecially teens and young adults-by portraying tobacco use as
a way to convey the user's social status, lifestyle choices, political
preferences, and more. 60 Key advertising themes include that
55. M.B. Harrell et al., Flavored E-Cigarette Use: CharacterizingYouth, Young
Adult, and Adult Users, 5 PREVENTATIVE MED. REP. 33-34, 39 (2017) (noting that
"flavors play a particularly prominent role" in e-cigarette initiation among youth and
young adults, compared to adult users who initiate e-cigarette use to stop using
conventional cigarettes). Note, however, that e-cigarettes do not pose the same risks
See Wendy E. Parmet, Paternalism, Selfas conventional tobacco products.
governance, and Public Health: The Case of E-Cigarettes, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 924,
952 (2016).
56. Ruth E. Malone et al., Tobacco Industry Denormalisation as a Tobacco
Control Intervention: A Review, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 162, 162 (2012) (quoting Von
Eric LeGresley, A "Vector Analysis" of the Tobacco Epidemic, MEDICUS MUNDI
SCHWEIZ 1, 3 (1999), http://www.medicusmundi.ch/delbulletin/mms-bulletin/kampfdem-tabakkonsum/grundlagentexte-zur-tabakepidemie/a-vector-analysis-of-the-tobacco-epidemic [https://perma.cc/F6V4-WIU5T]).
57. David Hammond et al., Tobacco Denormalizationand Industry Beliefs Among
Smokers From Four Countries, 31 AM. J. PREV. MED. 225, 225 (2006).
58. GERARD S. PETRONE, TOBACCO ADVERTISING: THE GREAT SEDUCTION 154-55

(1996).
59. Speech by unknown author, RJ Reynolds Records (May 1989),
at
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edultobacco/docs/jrkm0084.
available
[https://perma.cclY63V-63GN].
60. See, e.g., BARBARA S. LYNCH & RICHARD J. BONNIE, GROWING UP TOBACCO
FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 105-06, 116, 120,
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tobacco use is "an expression of independence, individualism, and
social sophistication," 61 that '[t]obacco use is a rite of passage to
adulthood[,]' that "'[s]uccessful, popular people use tobacco[j"'
and that '[t]obacco use is relaxing in social situations."'62 Finally,
"[b]y associating tobacco use with commonplace activities, events,
social spaces, or mind-sets, advertising reassures users that
smoking and chewing are normal, pervasive, and socially
acceptable."63
Advertising restrictions are intended to reduce demand in
part by constraining companies' ability to market their products
as a normal, socially desirable part of adult life. The Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 banned television and
radio ads for cigarettes and little cigars. 64 The Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 bans outdoor
advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds and
prohibits sponsorship of sports and entertainment events, among
other restrictions. 65 The 2009 law also gave state and local
governments more flexibility to enact time, place and manner
restrictions on cigarette advertising. 66 Many state and local
governments have focused on imposing additional restrictions on
outdoor and point-of-sale advertising.6 7
Advertising restrictions reduce consumers' and potential
consumers' exposure to tobacco marketing, which impacts a
person's attitudes about tobacco, likelihood of initiating tobacco
use, number of quit attempts, and prevalence of use. 68 For
123 (1994).
61. Id. at 118.
62. Id. at 120 (emphasis omitted).
63. Id. at 121.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1(2) (2012); Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,
61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (proposed Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. Pt. 801, 803,
804, 807, 820, 897).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2012) ("[A] State or locality may enact statutes and
promulgate regulations, based on smoking and health . . . imposing specific bans or
restrictions on the time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes."); see also Nat'1 Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc, v. City of
Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 76-81, 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing the legislative purpose
of § 1334(c), which was intended to provide greater authority to state and local
governments than had previously been granted by the Supreme Court).
67. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health?
Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1226-27, 1233 (2014)
(reviewing state and local restrictions on outdoor advertising).
68. See, e.g., Lisa Henriksen, Comprehensive Tobacco Marketing Restrictions:
Promotion, Packaging, Price and Place, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 147, 149 (2012).
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example, longitudinal studies indicate that "within months after
the [United Kingdom] banned [tobacco] advertising, . . . Fewer
adolescents (ages 13-15) overestimated smoking prevalence
of
tobacco
measure
important
an
peers[,]"
among
69
It is difficult to isolate the impact of
denormalization.
advertising restrictions from other tobacco control measures, such
as tax increases or minimum price laws, which are often
implemented at the same time as advertising restrictions. The
few studies that have attempted to so isolate tobacco control
measures suggest that only price increases are more effective
than advertising restrictions in reducing the prevalence of tobacco
use. 70
D. Counter-Marketing
Marketing campaigns sponsored by government and
nongovernmental organizations can be used to counter industry
advertising by portraying tobacco products as unethical or
unclean, tobacco companies as manipulative, and tobacco users as
Although health communications
socially ostracized.71
campaigns have long used mass media to convey messages about
the health risks of tobacco use, more recent efforts against tobacco
use prompt people "not only to avoid hazardous health
consequences or legal sanctions (such as cigarette taxes), but also
to escape from such psychological punishments as social isolation
or embarrassment." 72 Campaigns highlighting the effects of
tobacco use on appearance (wrinkled skin, yellow teeth) and
sexual desirability (bad breath, impotence) are characteristic of
the denormalization strategy. For example, a campaign launched
by the FDA in 2014 focused on cosmetic effects as well as other
social costs like being pulled away from the school dance by the
need to go outside to smoke, and the loss of control that

69. Id.
70. See, e.g., M. M. Schaap et al., Effect of Nationwide Tobacco Control Policies
on Smoking Cessation in High and Low Educated Groups in 18 European Countries,
17 TOBACCO CONTROL 248, 254 (2008); D. T. Levey et al., The Role of Tobacco Control
Policies in Reducing Smoking and Deaths in a Middle Income Nation: Results from the
Thailand SimSmoke Simulation Model, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 53, 57 (2008).
71. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth
and Young Adults: A Report of the Surgeon General, 635, 643, 669, 672 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books[NBK99237/pdflBookshelfNBK99237.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EP4-GGJK].
72. Kim & Shanahan, supra note 8, at 349.
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Messages aiming to denormalize
accompanies addiction. 73
tobacco use "do not try to persuade young adults they risk serious
health problems in later life, but instead undermine the
immediate social and psychological benefits they hope to access
by smoking." 74

Evidence suggests that this approach is more

effective than campaigns focusing solely on straightforward
descriptions of health risks.75
Some campaigns specifically target the tobacco industry and
its practices. For example, the "Truth Campaign" highlights
internal industry documents describing deceptive marketing
practices or denigrating consumers. 76 In the words of the
advertising executive who steered the campaign's development,

.

While rather counterintuitive, what made tobacco so
alluring to youth was its deadly qualities . . .
Generations of well[-]intentioned social marketers
had pounded the airwaves doing everything they
could to explain that tobacco kills. What they did not
understand (and the tobacco industry did) was that
they risked actually making tobacco that much more
appealing to youth .... [W]e surmised that we could
not take away [teens'] tool of rebellion without
giving them an alternative. Attacking the duplicity
and manipulation of the tobacco industry became
"truth's" rebellion.77

73. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The Real Cost: Campaign Overview, THE CTR. FOR
TOBACCO

PRODS.

(last

updated

March

2017),

https://www.fda.gov/down-

loads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/AbouttheCenterforTobaccoProducts/PublicEducationCampaigns/TheRealCostCampaign/UCM384307.pdf; [https://perma.cc/9W6Q-KZSB]; Li-Ling Huang et al., Impact
of The Real Cost Campaign on Adolescents' Recall, Attitudes, and Risk Perceptions
About Tobacco Use: A NationalStudy, 14 INT'L. J. ENvTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 42, 4243 (2017); Brice, R.J. Cyler in "The Real Cost" Commercial, No PINK SPANDEX (July
29,

2016),

http://awwman.com/

nps/main/2016/07/r-j-cyler-in-the-real-cost-commer-

ciall [https://perma.cclVA7R-JUUK].
74. Janet Hoek et al., A Qualitative Exploration of Young Adult Smokers'
Responses to Novel Tobacco Warnings, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 609, 610 (2013).
75. See, e.g., Huang et al., supra note 73, at 43; John Taylor et al., A Qualitative
Evaluation of Novel Intervention Using Insight into Tobacco Industry Tactics to
Prevent the Uptake of Smoking in School-aged Children, 16 BMC PUB. HEALTH 539,
540 (2016).
76. Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The Influence of the National Truth Campaign@

on Smoking Initiation, 36 AM. J. PREV. MED. 379 (2009); Amanda Kalaydjian
Richardson et al., Evidence for Truth@: The Young Adult Response to a Youth-Focused
Anti-Smoking Campaign, 39 AM. J. PREV. MED. 500, 500 (2010).
77. Jeffrey J. Hicks, The Strategy Behind Florida's 'Truth" Campaign, 10
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These efforts, sometimes referred to as tobacco industry
denormalization, are "associated with a decreased risk of smoking
initiation," reduced smoking prevalence, and increased quit
attempts and intentions to quit. 78 They may also contribute to
political support for more stringent regulation of the tobacco
industry.79
E. Warning Mandates
In 1965, shortly after the first Surgeon General's report on
smoking and health, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
promulgated a rule requiring that all tobacco advertisements
include a warning about health hazards. A few years later,
Congress preempted the FTC rule by enacting a warning mandate
that applied to product packaging, but did not apply to
advertisements. Once a pioneer of tobacco control efforts, the U.S.
has now fallen behind other countries, many of which have
adopted large, graphic warning labels depicting the health and
social consequences of tobacco use and urging tobacco users to
quit.80 The black and white, text-only warnings that are used in
the U.S. to convey the Surgeon General's advice about smoking
and health have not been updated in decades. The 2009 Tobacco
Control Act directed the FDA to develop graphic warnings that
would occupy 50% of cigarette packs. 81 As discussed below, the
FDA withdrew its proposed warnings in 2013 after a circuit split
emerged regarding their constitutionality under the Supreme
Court's evolving commercial speech jurisprudence.
The graphic warnings proposed by the FDA focused on health
effects, rather than social consequences, but the images were
arresting enough to prompt one commentator to argue that they
impose a "psychic tax" on tobacco users:

ToBACCO CONTROL 3, 4 (2001).
78. Farrelly et al., supranote 76, at 381-82; Malone et al., supra note 56, at 162,
168; see, e.g., Debra H. Bernat et al., Adolescent Smoking Trajectories:Results from a
Population-BasedCohort Study, 43 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 334, 337-40 (2008).
79. Malone, supra note 56, at 162, 169.
80. Gostin & Wiley, supra note 36, at 447-48.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1-2) (2012).
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[B]y making risks vivid and easy to imagine, graphic
warnings may trigger an emotional response that
textual warnings do not .... Marketing experts have
long relied on classical conditioning to associate
their products with positive emotions.
Graphic
warnings may have the opposite effect. In other
words, they may condition people to experience
negative emotions when presented with a particular
product . . . . [B]y manipulating feelings of guilt,
graphic warnings may channel consumption choices
in the direction that the government deems
appropriate. 82
Graphic warning labels used in other countries are more
clearly linked to denormalization, focusing on impotence as a
health risk associated with smoking, 83 warning that "smoking
causes foul and offensive breath," 84 and depicting addiction with
an image of a man behind bars made of cigarettes. 85 Warning
mandates place denormalization messages where governmentsponsored campaigns cannot reach: on product packaging.
Research suggests that warning labels focusing on short-term
social consequences are more effective in dissuading teens from
smoking than warnings focused on health effects. 86
F. Smoke-Free Laws
Smoke-free laws target individual smokers and potential
smokers as the hosts of disease and as vectors for delivery of
secondhand smoke to nonsmokers. State and local jurisdictions
regulate smokers directly by making smoking a civil offense. For

82. Gary M. Lucas, Paternalism and Psychic Taxes: The Government's Use of
Negative Emotions to Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 227, 254-55
(2013).
83. P. Vateesatokit et al., Thailand: Wining Battles, But the War's Far From Over,
9 TOBACCO CONTROL 122, 123-24 (2000), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/
tobaccocontrol/9/2/122.full.pdf; [https://perma.cc/Q33S-VQFE]; D. Hammond et al.,
Impact of the Graphic Canadian Warning Labels on Adult Smoking Behaviour, 12
TOBACCO CONTROL 391, 393 (2003).
84. New Zealand: Tobacco Labelling Regulations, TOBACCO LABELING RESOURCE
CTR., http://www. tobaccolabels.calcountries/new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/4VWPEHNYJ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
85. European Union: Tobacco Labelling Regulations, TOBACCO LABELING
RESOURCE CTR., http://www.tobaccolabels.ca/countries/european-union/ [https://permacc/BCV2-75BE] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
86. Hoek et al., supra note 74, at 610.
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example, an Illinois statute prohibiting smoking in public places,
places of employment, and government-owned vehicles imposes a
fine of "$100 for a first offense and $250 for each subsequent
87
offense" on individuals who smoke in prohibited areas.
Smoke-free laws may also regulate third parties by mandating
that they adopt policies prohibiting smoking. For example, the
same Illinois statute obligates individuals and corporations that
own, operate, or otherwise control a public place or place of
88
employment to post no smoking signs, remove ashtrays, and
89
"reasonably assure that smoking is prohibited," subject to a fine
of "$250 for the first violation, . . . $500 for the second violation
within one year . . . , and $2,500 for each additional violation
within one year . . ."90
Within the last several years, a few local governments have
pioneered the adoption of ordinances prohibiting smoking in
multi-unit housing facilities. 91 Many ordinances apply only to
publicly subsidized housing, while others apply to non-subsidized
units as well. 92 Smoke-free housing laws reduce the exposure of
nonsmokers to secondhand smoke in their homes because it is not
possible to block smoke from traveling through ventilation
systems and other conduits. 93 Tobacco residue can be found on
the floors and surfaces of nonsmokers' homes due to smoking in
94
neighboring units, posing a hazard to young children.
Like recent efforts to prohibit smoking in multi-unit housing
facilities, early prohibitions on smoking in enclosed spaces such
as restaurants, bars, and workplaces were justified primarily in
terms of harm to others from secondhand smoke. It soon became
clear, however, that these laws "reduce smoking because [they]
undercut the social support network for smoking by implicitly

87. 410 ILL. COMiP. STAT. 82/45(b) (2016).
88. 410 ILL. COMiP. STAT. 82/15; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/45(b).
89. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/20(b-c).
90. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/45(b).
91. Diller, supranote 67, at 1230.
92. Mireya Navarro, U.S. Will Ban Smoking in Public Housing Nationwide, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/nyregion/us-will-bansmoking-in-public-housing-nationwide.html?_r=0 https://perma.cc/M6NA-9YSF].
93. Nat'1 Ctr. for Healthy Housing, Reasons to Explore Smoke-Free Housing,
http://www.nchh.org/portals/0/contents/nchhgreen factsheet smokefree.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8HN-JE73] (last visited April 17, 2017); Karen M. Wilson et al.,
Tobacco-Smoke Exposure in Children Who Live in Multiunit Housing, 127 PEDIATRICS
85, i, viii-ix, 86 (2011).
94. See U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Regulatory Impact Analysis,
Instituting Smoke-Free Public Housing 7-8 (Dec. 5, 2016).
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defining smoking as an antisocial act." 95 The denormalization
purpose of smoke-free laws has become increasingly explicit as
several jurisdictions have extended smoke-free rules to outdoor
areas where secondhand smoke poses little risk.9 6 "[E]fforts to
extend smoking bans to beaches and parks [appear to be] policy
initiatives designed to denormalize smoking[,] having as their
ultimate goal a profound transformation in public norms and
behavior." 97 Some jurisdictions have expanded their smoke-free
laws to include e-cigarettes because of concerns that the rapid
98
increase in e-cigarette use could renormalize smoking behavior.

Smoke-free laws are aimed at altering the behavior of current
smokers while also altering the social environment in which
consumers make choices about whether to initiate or continue
tobacco use. 99 Bans on smoking in workplaces, restaurants, bars,
and other spaces make it less convenient to smoke, while also
"reducing smoking visibility in these settings and encouraging
societal disapproval of smoking."10 0 Smoke-free housing laws,
particularly if they are applied to subsidized low-income housing,
leave residents with few alternatives to quitting. They may also
create a more supportive environment for those who are trying to
quit. 10 1 "MVore than most other tobacco control measures, smokefree legislation can denormalize tobacco use by transforming
smoking norms and accelerating approval of a nonsmoking
95. RONALD BAYER & ERIC FELDMAN, UNFILTERED: CONFLICTS OVER TOBACCO

POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 24 (2004) (quoting Samuel Glantz); see also Burris (2002),
supra note 18, at 187 ("From being a glamorous activity, smoking has been
transformed into antisocial self-destruction. Law, it is said, has played a role in this
by, for example, forcing smokers who wish to light up in public to congregate in special
and often undesirable areas, such as outside the doors of smoke-free facilities or in
sepulchral basement smoking rooms.").
96. Ronald Bayer & Kathleen E. Bachynski, Banning Smoking in Parks and on
Beaches: Science, Policy, and the Politicsof Denormalization,32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1291
(2013).
97. Id. at 1291.
98. See Parmet, supra note 55.

&

99. Tan CE et al., Association Between Smoke-free Legislation and
Hospitalizations for Cardiac, Cerebrovascular, and Respiratory Diseases: A MetaAnalysis, 126 CIRCULATION 2177 (Oct. 30, 2012); Cheng KW et al., Association Between
Smokefree Laws and Voluntary Smokefree-Home Rules, 41 AM. J. PREV. MED. 566
(2011).
100. Abraham Brown et al., A Longitudinal Study of Policy Effect (Smoke-free
Legislation) on Smoking Norms: ITC Scotland/United Kingdom, 11 NICOTINE
TOBACCO RES. 924, 925 (2009).
101. Maya Vijayaraghavan, The Effectiveness of CigarettePrice and Smoke-Free
Homes on Low-Income Smokers in the United States, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2276
(2013); A. Hyland et al., Smoke-Free Homes and Smoking Cessation and Relapse in a
Longitudinal Population of Adults, 11 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 614 (2009).
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norm."1

G. Discrimination Against Tobacco Users
Some interventions target tobacco users indirectly by
permitting or even encouraging private parties to discriminate
against tobacco users. Employers, health insurers, landlords, and
condominium associations all have economic incentives to
discriminate against tobacco users. Insurers pay for much of the
health care tobacco users need. Market forces and regulations
limit their ability to pass those costs along to users. In addition to
bearing significant health care costs, employers may also be
affected by lost productivity due to tobacco users who experience
more frequent illness. Landlords have legitimate concerns about
property damage to units occupied by smokers. In each of these
cases, private parties may be seeking to deter tobacco users from
applying for jobs, insurance, or housing, to encourage current
employees, insureds, or residents to quit, or a combination of the
two. Considering that the vast majority of the population does not
smoke, landlords, condominium associations, and employers may
try to attract nonsmokers by barring smokers. 103 Some employers
announce their intention to discriminate against tobacco users
quite publicly, 104 suggesting that a stance against tobacco use is
part of the image they wish to present to the public.105
Even employers who are willing to hire tobacco users
routinely discriminate against them with respect to the terms of
health insurance coverage. The Affordable Care Act's (ACA)
restrictions on discrimination based on health status-related

102. Brown, supra note 100, at 923.
103. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 47 ("Firms boldly announce that they will
not employ and may even fire smokers, because of the additional cost of their medical
care, or because smoking does not project the 'image' they want to project to the
public.").
104. Christopher Valleau, If You're Smoking You're Fired: How Tobacco Could Be
Dangerous to More Than Just Your Health, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 457, 462
(2007) (describing high profile announcements by employers).
105. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21. See also Elizabeth Rader et al., No Smokers
Allowed, 30 ACC DOCKET 80 (April 10, 2012) (quoting an announcement by the
Cleveland Clinic that it will not hire smokers: "As a true 'healthcare'provider,we must
create a culture of wellness that permeates the entire institution, from the care we
provide, to our physical environment, to the food we offer, and yes, even to our
employees. If we are to be advocates of healthy living and disease prevention, we need
to be role models for our patients, our communities and each other. In other words, if
we are to 'talk the talk' we need to 'walk the walk. "'.
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factors, which inspired Roberts's first foray into healthism,1 06
explicitly permit discrimination based on tobacco use.107 In the
employer-based insurance market, insurers have long been
required to set premiums at the population level rather than
discriminating based on an individual employee's (and
dependents') risk profile.108 Insurers are permitted, however, to
impose penalties on individual employees for tobacco use through
a wellness program, an exception that is codified within the
ACA.109

Health insurers operating independently of employers also
discriminate against tobacco users. The ACA permits insurers in
the small-group and non-group markets to vary premiums for
individual versus family coverage and based on geographic area,
age, and tobacco use-while prohibiting rate setting based on any
other consideration. 110 Through either mechanism-the premium
surcharge in the direct-purchase market or wellness program
penalties in the group market-insurers may charge tobacco
users up to 50% more than nonusers.111
III. FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING TOBACCO
DENORMALIZATION
In applying their anti-healthism principle to policies that
discriminate on the basis of tobacco use, Roberts and Leonard
enter an ongoing debate over the legal and ethical permissibility
of tobacco control. In this part, I introduce four alternative
frameworks for assessing tobacco denormalization. I begin by
describing the legal protections that apply to tobacco control
generally and denormalization in particular. Then I describe

106. Roberts (2012), supra note 23.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
108. Roberts (2012), supra note 23, at 1178-82 (discussing limits discrimination
imposed on group health plans by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act).
109. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy
Behavior? An Assessment of the Affordable Care Act's Personal Responsibility for
Wellness Provisions, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 642 (2014) (discussing the history of
wellness program regulation under HIPAA and the ACA) [hereinafter Wiley Access to
Health Care].
110. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (2012).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (providing that rates may not vary
based on tobacco use by more than a ratio of 1.5 to 1); Wiley Access to Health Care,
supra note 109, at 680 n.146 (discussing the HHS Secretary's decision to raise the
threshold for wellness program rewards to 50% for tobacco cessation, but not for other
programs).
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health justice, the libertarian principle of anti-healthism, and
Roberts and Leonard's alternative anti-healthism principle.
A. Legal Protections
The Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional
protections for liberty and autonomy allow the government wide
latitude to discourage tobacco consumption. Of course, "[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention smoking" or tobacco. 112
"Therefore, if there were a constitutional right to smoke" or use or
sell tobacco products, "it would have to fall under the umbrella of
one of the recognized constitutional rights." 113 One argument is
that the liberty to sell and use tobacco products is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 114
Another argument is that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (applied to the federal government via
incorporation into the Fifth) protects tobacco users and sellers
Finally, the First
from unjustified discrimination. 115
Amendment's guarantee of free expression has implications for
communication about tobacco use, including governmentsponsored countermarketing, advertising restrictions, and
Essentially, while the government's
warning mandates. 116
legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of the
people (even from their own choices and actions) is well
established, 117 in cases where a fundamental right or suspect
classification is implicated, a purely paternalistic government
interest may not be sufficiently compelling to justify
infringement. 118
112. Samantha K. Graff, There is No Constitutional Right to Smoke, TOBACCO
CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM

2 (2008),

http://www.smokefreehousingny.org/wp-

content/uploads/No-constitutional-right.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HTL-TEVG].
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. GOsTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 449-57.
117. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding
the constitutionality of an arrest and the jailing of a woman for failure to wear a
seatbelt); Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (D. Mass. 1972) (per curiam)
(holding that a statute requiring motorcyclists to wear protective headgear does not
violate due process, notwithstanding the claim that "police power does not extend to
overcoming the right of an individual to incur risks that involve only himself'), aff'd
without opinion, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
118. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 n.12 (1996)
(striking down a regulation prohibiting advertisement of alcohol prices on First
Amendment grounds, in part because "[i]t is perfectly obvious that alternative forms
of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to
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Tobacco users and sellers have found little success under the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Although the Due Process
Clause has been interpreted as protecting a fundamental right to
privacy, including decisional privacy, 119 the Supreme Court has
not extended constitutional privacy doctrine to encompass a right
to buy, sell, or use any particular product or service in any
Longstanding Supreme Court
particular configuration.1 20
precedents interpreting the Equal Protection Clause apply
minimal judicial scrutiny to government actions that draw
classifications that are not constitutionally suspect. 12 1 Actions
that distinguish between tobacco users and nonusers, between
tobacco products and other products, between tobacco
manufacturers and other manufacturers, or between tobacco
retailers and other retailers satisfy the Constitution's guarantee

achieve the State's goal of promoting temperance" including taxation, direct regulation
establishing minimum prices or maximum per capita purchases, or education); Va.

State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)
(striking down a "highly paternalistic" regulation prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising the prices of prescription drugs, but noting that the state "is free to require
whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists"); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 477, 484 (1973) (rejecting sex discrimination "rationalized by an
attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage").
119. GOsTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 135-36.
120. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697, 703-07 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159
(2008) (holding that terminally ill adult patients do not have a fundamental right of
access to investigational drugs, after surveying the long history of drug regulation);
Lange-Kessler v. Dep't of Educ. of N.Y., 109 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
the right to privacy does not encompass a woman's right to choose a direct-entry
midwife to assist during childbirth); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65
ME. L. REV. 737, 744 (2013) (concluding that there is no constitutionally protected
right to consume the foods of one's choosing, based on "the long history of curtailment
of food choice, and the lack of any constitutional protection or tradition of broadly
protecting food rights"). "[T]he Court declared decades ago its 'abandonment of the
use of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority
of the Court believed to be economically unwise."' In re Late Fee and Over-Limit Fee
Litig. v. Bank of America, 741 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) and citing Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND OF JUDICIAL REVIEW DISTRUST: A THEORY 14 (1980) (Lochner and

similar cases are "now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally
improper"); see Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process,
1987 WIS. L. REV. 265 (reviewing the historical development and demise of enhanced
constitutional protection of economic liberties under the substantive due process
doctrine, assessing proposals to revive it, and ultimately concluding that such a revival
would be inadvisable).
121. Suspect classifications include race, color, national origin, and religion.
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 137-38.
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of equal protection unless they lack a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose-a very low bar. Discouraging tobacco
use is widely accepted as a legitimate government purpose. 122
Under the rational basis test applicable to most tobacco control
measures, judges are generally reluctant to second-guess
lawmakers' judgment regarding the best means for serving that
purpose. 123
The First Amendment provides the only significant
constitutional limit on governmental tobacco control. Beginning
in the 1960s, the Supreme Court extended limited First
Amendment protection to commercial advertisers. 124 Under an
intermediate review standard articulated by the Court in 1980,
the government bears the burden of showing that restrictions on
commercial speech directly advance a substantial government
interest and are no more extensive than necessary to serve that
Reducing tobacco use is widely viewed as a
interest. 125
substantial interest, 12 6 but courts have invalidated some
restrictions on tobacco advertising based on a judicial
determination that lawmakers' chosen means do not directly
advance that interest or are more extensive than necessary. 127
Tobacco companies and others continue to litigate the open
question of whether the same standard applies to compelled
speech, including mandated warnings. The Supreme Court has
differentiated between mandates that "prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein" and those that "prescribe what shall be orthodox in
122. See GoSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 456.
123. Id. at 147-48.
124. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
773 (1976).
125. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 477 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
126. But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d
1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assuming that the FDA has a substantial interest in
reducing smoking rates, while cautioning in a footnote that "we are skeptical that the
government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from
purchasing a lawful product, even one that has been conclusively linked to adverse
health consequences. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has at least implied that the
government could have a substantial interest in reducing smoking rates because
smoking poses 'perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the
United States."' (quoting U.S. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't.
of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
127. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 455 (discussing Loriliard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
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commercial advertising." 128 The Court has applied the more
lenient rational basis test to evaluate mandates to disclose
"purely factual and uncontroversial information" about a product
or service, 129 but the scope of this carve-out is unclear.130
Although these cases concern the liberty enjoyed by tobacco
sellers rather than consumers, decisions striking down
advertising restrictions often rely on a pro-consumer rationale.1 31
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that protecting
commercial enterprises' freedom of expression serves the public's
interest in receiving information about lawful consumer
products. 132 But the notion that constitutional protection for
commercial speech is justified by consumer freedom only goes so
far. Ironically, courts have struck down advertising regulations
precisely because the government has the option of reducing
tobacco use through other means (e.g., banning tobacco products
or mandating a minimum price) that are less restrictive of sellers'
speech, even though many would view them as far more
restrictive of consumers' freedom.133
Moving from constitutional to statutory limits on tobacco
control, state and local governments have broad police power to
adopt antidiscrimination protections that extend beyond the
Supreme Court's Equal Protection Doctrine. As discussed in more
detail below, about half of states prohibit employment
discrimination based on off-the-job tobacco use1 34 and several

128. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
129. Id.
130. See infra Part III.D.
131. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 143 (discussing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975) and Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 748 (1976)); Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
An Originalist'sRecollections, 54 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 1189 (2004).
132. GoSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 456.
133. Id. (discussing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 476 (1995).
134. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-195(a)(4) (West 1957) (providing that it is
a discriminatory or unfair employment practice "[flor an employer to require as a
condition of employment that any employee or prospective employee use or refrain

from using tobacco products outside the course of his employment, or otherwise to
discriminate against any person in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions
or privileges of employment on the basis of use or nonuse of tobacco products outside

the course of his employment unless it is a bona fide occupational qualification that a
person not use tobacco products outside the workplace. Nothing within this paragraph
shall prohibit an employer from offering, imposing or having in effect a health,
disability or life insurance policy distinguishing between employees for type or price
of coverage based upon the use or nonuse of tobacco products if: (A) Differential rates
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states have broader statutes barring employment discrimination
based on any lawful, off-the-job activity or consumption of lawful
products. 135 The tobacco industry has joined civil liberties
advocates to promote protections for smokers. 136 These laws are
in tension with federal rules that permit employers to penalize
tobacco users by imposing higher health insurance premiums or
less favorable cost-sharing terms on them via an employee health
Congress has expressly saved state and local
plan.
antidiscrimination laws from preemption, however, noting that
wellness programs must comply with applicable federal and state
antidiscrimination laws.
The federal government has also used its power to regulate
interstate commerce to restrict disability discrimination by
employers, public programs, and public accommodations. Courts
have held that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not
afford protection to nicotine addicts. 137 These precedents predate
2008 amendments to the ADA that significantly broadened its
definition of disability, however, and the current status of nicotine
addiction as a protected disability is unclear. 138 As noted above,
the Affordable Care Act explicitly permitted discrimination
against tobacco users, even as it restricted discrimination based
on other health status-related factors.
Public health law scholar Scott Burris (whose work on the
ethics of shame-based public health interventions is discussed in
Part I.C below) has argued that public health advocates should
be mindful of the limitations of law as a tool for protecting people
from health-based stigma: "Much, perhaps most, enacted stigma
assessed employees reflect an actual differential cost to the employer; and (B)
Employers provide written notice to employees setting forth the differential rates
imposed by insurance carriers.").
135. See Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discrimination in Employment, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 418 (2003) ("'Smokers' rights' laws swept through
more than two dozen legislatures in the early 1990s as a result of the combined
lobbying of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the tobacco industry.
These laws were provoked primarily by reports that a significant number of firms
already refused to hire smokers and a fear that the trend was growing. At the urging
of the ACLU and others, once smokers' rights proposals got into the legislative process,
they were broadened in some jurisdictions . . . to cover alcohol, to cover all legal
products, to cover other specific behavior, as in New York, and to cover all off-work
behavior, as in North Dakota and Colorado.").
136. Id.
137. See e.g., Brashear v. Simms, 138 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (D. Md. 2001).
138. Matthew M. Allen, Everybody's Vaping for the Weekend: Nicotine Addiction
as a Workplace Disability, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2016) (arguing that the 2008
amendments and recent case law "can be interpreted to protect nicotine addicts who
consume electronic cigarettes during smoking cessation attempts").
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will not take the form of the sort of overt and demonstrably
intentional discrimination prohibited by law." 139 For this reason,

Burris and others turn to extralegal frameworks to assess
potential interventions, rather than ending their inquiry by
determining that discriminatory or shame-based interventions
are legally permissible. In turn, these extralegal frameworks may
guide lawmakers as they assess potential reforms and judges and
regulatory agencies as they interpret existing laws.
B. Libertarian Anti-Healthism
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional protections for
tobacco users' and sellers' liberty interests, critics of tobacco
control have long argued as a political and ethical matter that
anti-tobacco regulations go too far in hampering autonomy. Some
libertarian critics, most famously Robert Crawford 40 and Petr
Skrabanek, have used the term healthism to describe "the
ideology of the 'health of the nation,"' which they warn poses a
danger "to our right to do as we like with our lives, to our
autonomy to pursue our kind of happiness, to the liberty of the
Savage

smoker,

in the Brave New World." 14 1
142

Skrabanek,

himself a

traced the rise of healthism as a "state ideology" to

139. Burris (2002), supra note 18, at 182.
140. Robert Crawford, Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life, 10
INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 365, 368 (1980) (defining healthism "as the preoccupation
with personal health as a primary-often the primary-focus for the definition and
achievement of well-being; a goal which is to be attained primarily through the
modification of life styles, with or without therapeutic help."); Robert Crawford, Health
&

as a Meaningful Social Practice, 10 HEALTH 401 (2006); see also SHARI L. DWORKIN
LINDA FAYE WATTS, BODY PANIC: GENDER, HEALTH, AND THE SELLING OF FITNESS 11-

12 (2009) (crediting Crawford with coining the term healthism).
141. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 11; see also DANIEL CALLAHAN,
PROMOTING HEALTHY BEHAVIOR: How MUCH FREEDOM? How MUCH RESPONSIBILITY'?

141-142 (2000) (discussing the tyranny of "healthism"); Stacy Carter et al., Shared
Health Governance: The Potential Danger of Oppressive "Healthism", 11 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 57, 68 (2011) (characterizing "oppressive healthism" as "impairing people's
opportunities to be who they want to be by enforcing health practices that may not be
valued by all-or even by most."); Andrea Freeman, The UnbearableWhiteness ofMilk:
Food Oppression and the USDA, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1251, 1270 (2013)
("Healthism promotes the ideals of thinness and fitness and perceives individuals who
fail to adhere to or achieve these ideals to be imposing unfair costs on others."); See
e.g. KATE FITZPATRICK & RICHARD TINNING, EDS., HEALTH EDUCATION: CRITICAL

PERSPECTIVES (2014) (collecting several essays reflecting on Crawford's concept of
healthism).
142. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 9. After his death at age 53 from
prostate cancer, Skrabanek was accused of accepting support from the tobacco
industry. See Clare Dyer, Tobacco Company Set Up Network of Sympathetic Scientists,
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efforts in the United States in the 1970s to attack the "moralists'
trinity of evils-drink, tobacco, and sex." 143 It was then, he
argued, that the government first adopted a strategy that "goes
beyond education and information on matters of health and uses
propaganda and various forms of coercion to establish norms of a
144
'healthy lifestyle' for all."

Skrabanek was not a legal scholar, but his position would
support a broader reading of the Due Process Clause to protect
the liberty to buy and use products and services despite the
government's determination that they are harmful. His position
might also support broader First Amendment constraints on
mandated commercial speech by rejecting the Supreme Court's
current distinction between government efforts to prescribe
orthodox ideology (which are strictly scrutinized by judges) and
those that aim merely to prescribe what is orthodox in matters of
commercial advertising.
Skrabanek frequently articulated his position in terms of
debates over the legitimate scope of medical practice and public
health. He criticized the rise of what he called "anticipatory
medicine," which, he explained, "is not the same as traditional
preventive medicine which was limited mainly to vaccination
against specific diseases, and the reduction of the spread of
infection by maintaining a clean water supply, abattoir
inspection, control of the food chain, etc." He connected this
phenomenon to the rise of a new model of public health:

316 BMJ 1553 (1998). The Lancet, also implicated in the scandal, clarified that the
accusations were unsubstantiated and that there was no evidence that Skrabanek's
writings published in the Lancet were influenced by any relationship he may have had
with the tobacco industry. James McCormich & Robin Fox, Death of Petr Skrabanek,
In response to the scandal, the Lancet Ombudsman
344 LANCET 52 (1994).
recommended that, going forward, the journal should require all authors to declare
financial relationships with industry. See Thomas Sherwood, Ombudsman's Second
Report, and Tobacco, 352 LANCET 7 (1998). Richard Epstein, a legal scholar who has
articulated libertarian views in his work on tobacco control, has disclosed ties to the
tobacco industry. See Richard A. Epstein, Subrogation, and Insurance, with Special
Reference to the Tobacco Litigation, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 493, 493 (1997) ("[F]irst a
disclaimer. I have worked with Philip Morris on a variety of tobacco cases for a long
period of time.") [hereinafter Epstein (1997)].
143. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 11-12; see also Crawford Healthism and
the Medicalization of Everyday Life, supra note 140 (linking healthism to "social
effort[s] to gain control over that part of the human experience captured by the concept
of health. . . made in the late 1970s in the United States.").
144. Skrabanek (1994), supranote 28, at 15.
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While the old public health was based on discoveries
made by natural sciences and on technology and
engineering, the new public health, while retaining
the title, has little to do with science. . . . It accepts
evidence not according to its quality but according to
its conformity with a foregone conclusion. Nearly all
its evidence is based on convoluted statistical
arguments.145
In his characteristically stark, memorable prose, Skrabanek
cautioned: "The roads to unfreedom are many. Signposts on one
of them bear the inscription HEALTH FOR ALL."146
Legal scholars have also sought to defend the old public
health against the new. 147 Richard Epstein, 148 Mark Hall, 149 and
50
Mark Rothsteino
have expressed concerns about the expansion
of public health law to encompass noncommunicable disease,
injury prevention, and the social determinants of health. 15 1
Epstein in particular has argued vehemently against categorizing

145. Skrabanak (1994), supra note 28, at 28. See also P. Skrabanek, Smoking
and Statistical Overkill, 340 THE LANCET 1208 (1992) [hereinafter Skrabanek (1992)]
("In clinical medicine, strict standards apply for evaluation of therapies, and anything
short of randomized double blind trials is frowned upon as unreliable evidence. By
contrast, risk-factor epidemiology relies on case-control or cohort studies, without
rigorous standards of design, execution, and interpretation, even though such studies
are susceptible to at least fifty-six different biases . . . . In politically sensitive areasfor example, the alleged harm of passive smoking-poor data are manipulated to reach
a foregone conclusion.").
146. Skrabanak (1994), supra note 28, at 11.
147. See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 207 (2012) (characterizing and responding to critics of an expanded
scope of public health law) [hereinafter Wiley New Public Health].
148. Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: In Defense of the
"Old" Public Health, 46 PERSP.
IN BIOLOGY & MED.
8138 (2003)
(hereinafter Epstein (2003)]; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the "Old"PublicHealth,
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (2004) [hereinafter Epstein (2004)]; Richard A. Epstein, What
(Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate AristotelianAnswer, 93 GEO. L. J. 1361 (2005)
[hereinafter Epstein (2005)].
149. Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 64 PERSP. IN
BIOLOGY & MED. 8199, 8199, S207 (2003).
150. Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 144 (2002); Mark A. Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health: A Response, 2
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 84 (2009).
151. See, e.g., LISA F. BERKMAN & ICHIRO KAWACHI, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 35254 (2000); JULIE G. CWIKEL, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

ACTIVISM 371 (2006). For a critical discussion of the emergence of social epidemiology
as a distinct field, see Gerhard A. Zielhuis & Lambertus A.L.M. Kiemeney, Social
Epidemiology? No Way, 30 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 43 (2001).
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so-called lifestyle diseases related to diet, physical inactivity, and
tobacco use as "public health" problems because "the case for
government intervention . . . gets that extra boost of legitimacy"
when framed as a public health issue. 152
Epstein and like-minded legal scholars base their libertarian
critique largely on economic theory." These scholars view people
as rational actors who carefully weigh costs and benefits and
make choices that maximize their own utility (or well-being). If
this view is correct, paternalism in general, and psychic taxes in
particular, should play no role in government policy." 153 Some,
such as Epstein, attack the very premise that tobacco use and
other risk factors for noncommunicable disease are legitimate
public problems, as opposed to personal ones: 154
[S]ome measure of blame for poor health and wealth
outcomes should fall on the individuals, and their
efforts at
parents, who have failed to make any ...
Most
self-improvement and self-preservation.
modern public health issues have nothing to do with
communicable diseases. The current killers are
drug abuse, obesity, diabetes, heart disease, high
blood pressure, tobacco and alcohol, all of which are
best controlled by individual decisions that don't
depend on state intervention to control or cure....
[The egalitarian] literature seems to suffer from an
undercurrent of making excuses for bad conduct,
which only aggravates the basic problem. Of course,
no one should treat all these harms as though they
But we should expect some
were self-inflicted.
the tough trade-off between
of
serious examination
extra assistance after the fact and the increased risk
155
of poor behaviors before the fact.
Others, such as Gary Lucas, point out that even if public
health advocates are content to have the government discourage
tobacco use, they should nonetheless be concerned about a
"slippery slope, leading to the adoption of laws that many people

152. Epstein (2004), supra note 148, at 1424.
153. Lucas, supra note 82, at 230.
154. Epstein (2005), supra note 149, at 1368-69.
155. Richard A. Epstein, DecentralizedResponses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck,
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 309, 338 (2009).
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will find objectionable or even abusive." 156 Lucas points to state
laws mandating. misleading statements by doctors about
purported risks of abortion. "Abortion-rights advocates will likely
find it easier to oppose this practice if the public generally
views psychic taxes with suspicion than if psychic taxes are an
established instrument for manipulating behavior."1 57 Lucas's
point, perhaps unintentionally, turns the central insight of the
denormalization strategy against its proponents: take care lest
government denormalization become normalized.
C. Health Justice
The question at the heart of libertarian critiques of new
public health's expanded focus on noncommunicable disease and
injury-what, if any, actions should the state adopt to encourage
healthier lifestyles-also animates the work of many public
health ethicists and legal scholars, including myself. Indeed, the
recent emergence of public health ethics as a discipline distinct
from bioethics and the ongoing public health law renaissance can
be traced, in part, to the issues raised by the new public health.15 8
Whereas bioethics and health care law are principally concerned
with the relationship between the patient and the health care
system with an eye toward securing patient autonomy, public
health law and ethics focus on the relationship between the
individual and the state with an eye toward balancing individual
autonomy with the common good. Public health ethicist Dan
Beauchamp began his seminal 1985 article with questions much
like those that drove Skrabanek's inquiry a decade later: "Can
there be good reasons for public health paternalism in a
democracy? Are health and safety individual interests, or also
common and shared ends?"1 59 Needless to say, ethicists and legal
scholars who identify themselves as working within the public
health tradition-myself included-typically adopt a perspective
that is at odds with libertarian antipaternalism. We are deeply

156. Lucas, supra note 82, at 231-32.
157. Id. at 231-32.
158. Wiley New Public Health, supra note 148, at 224 (describing the emergence
of the behavioral

and social-ecological models

of public health and associated

controversy over the legitimate scope of public health law); Lindsay F. Wiley, From
Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public's Interest in Affordable, HighQuality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV 833, 864-65 (2016) (describing the emergence
of public health ethics as distinct from bioethics) [hereinafter Wiley Patient Rights].
159. Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Traditionof Public Health,
15 THE HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (1985).
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concerned with individual liberty, but we seek to balance it with
collective interests in the context of a broader focus on social
justice. Nancy Kass describes public health ethics as aiming to
"advance traditional public health goals [of improving the health
of populations rather than of individuals] while maximizing
individual liberties and furthering social justice."1 6 0 Public health
ethicists propose, for example, that data must substantiate that a
[public health intervention] will reduce morbidity or mortality;
burdens of the program must be identified and minimized; the
program must be implemented fairly and must, at times,
minimize preexisting social injustices; and fair procedures must
be used to determine which burdens are acceptable to a
community.161
Similarly, Lawrence Gostin and I have advocated for a
systematic evaluation of public health regulation that draws on
public health science and ethics to assess (1) regulatory
justifications, (2) risks to health and safety, (3) the effectiveness
of interventions, (4) economic costs, (5) personal burdens, (6)
distribution of benefits and burdens, and (7) the transparency and
legitimacy of the regulatory process. 162
Gostin and I expressly advocate for health justice.163 Most
relevant for the purposes of this article, the health justice model
emphasizes the need for more probing inquiry into the effects of
class, racial, and other forms of social and cultural bias on the
design and implementation of measures to reduce health
disparities. 164 It also counsels prioritization of facilitating socialecological interventions (e.g., ensuring sufficient access to health

&

160. Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 AM. J. PUBLIC
HEALTH 1776, 1776 (2001). To be fair, Skrabanek raised concerns about social justice
as well as autonomy. "Extreme versions of healthism," he noted, "provide a
justification for racism, segregation, and eugenic control." He believed, however, that
this extreme situation was not found in "Western democracies" where a weaker version
of healthism prevails. Skrabanek (1994), supranote 28, at 15.
161. Kass, supra note 160, at 1776.
162. GosTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 40. The framework we describe, which
first appeared in previous editions of the text authored by Gostin alone, owes much to
the Human Rights Impact Assessment developed by Gostin and Jonathan Mann. See
Lawrence Gostin et al., Towards the Development of a Human Rights Impact
Assessment for the Formulationand Evaluation of PublicHealth Policies, 1 HEALTH
HUM. RTS. 58, 59 (1994).
163. Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 47, 83 (2014) [Hereinafter Wiley Social Justice]; Wiley Patient Rights, supra
note 158, at 888; GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 531-50; Lindsay F. Wiley,
Applying the Health JusticeFramework to Diabetes as a Community-managed Social
Phenomenon, 16 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 101, 129 (2016).
164. Wiley Social Justice, supra note 163, at 95-101.
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care and public health services and other forms of social support)
behavioral
victim-blaming
over
individually-targeted,
interventions (e.g., punishments and rewards that put the onus
on individuals to make healthier choices without necessarily
making it easier for them to do SO).165
To sum up the public health framework as I have described
it thus far: first, public health ethics requires an assessment of
the benefits and burdens of tobacco denormalization as a public
health intervention. Second, health justice requires attention to
the effects of bias on the design and implementation of tobacco
denormalization.
Third, health justice also demands
prioritization of facilitating social-ecological interventions over
individually-targeted behavioral interventions.
The growing literature on stigma and health provides
insights useful for applying many of the public health ethics and
Public health
health justice principles summarized above.
ethicists and legal scholars have questioned "the general
propriety of governmental attempts to direct social values and
lifestyles" even when these attempts are limited to government
sponsored communications. 166 They express alarm at government
interventions that exploit "unfavorable public sentiment toward
smoking . . . as an informal social control device that enforces
behavioral conformity among smokers."16 7 In part, these concerns
tobacco
tension between
arise out of the apparent
denormalization and the widely held view that stigmatization of
those who are already vulnerable provides the context within
which disease spreads, exacerbating morbidity and mortality by
erecting barriers between caregivers and those who are sick, and
by constraining those who would intervene to contain the spread
of illness. In this view, it is the responsibility of public health
officials to counteract stigmatization if they are to fulfill the
mission to protect the communal health. 168
Ethicists and legal scholars, including Scott Burris, 169
Jennifer Stuber, 170 and Ronald Bayer, 171 have built on the general
165. Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the EmergingLaw of Obesity Control,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 184 (2013) [hereinafter Wiley Obesity].
166. Ruth R. Faden, Ethical Issues in Government Sponsored Public Health
Campaigns, 14 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 27 (1987).
167. Kim & Shanahan, supra note 8, at 349.
168. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 47.
169. Burris (2002), supra note 18, at 179; Burris (2006), supra note 18, at 529;
Burris (2008), supranote 18.
170. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 47.
171. Id.; Bayer (2008) supra note 34, at 466.
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principles of public health ethics and sociological analyses of
stigma and health to assess whether tobacco denormalization is
consistent with the destigmatization strategy adopted by many
public health advocates with respect to HIV prevention.
Elsewhere, I have articulated these factors as follows:
shame-based public health intervention is inappropriate where
there is (1) a power differential between the stigmatized and the
"normal" that makes possible (2) labeling, stereotyping, and
categorization of the stigmatized as separate from the normal;
and (3) the experience of status loss and discrimination by the
stigmatized group that is enduring and engulfs the entire
identity. 172 Finally, after the first three factors have been
considered, a balancing of the negative impact of the purported
stigmatization against the potential utility of shame-based
sanctions, in terms of public health costs and benefits, may be
appropriate. 173
Considering these factors, Stuber, Bayer, and Burris
conclude that at least some forms of tobacco denormalization are
acceptable, but their conclusions are contingent on social factors
that are inherently dynamic.
Indeed, some tobacco control
advocates have called for reevaluating denormalization in light of
widening socioeconomic disparities between smokers and nonsmokers. For example, in 2010, Kristen Bell et al., argued that
"[s]tigmatizing smoking will not ultimately help to reduce
smoking prevalence amongst disadvantaged smokers-who now
represent the majority of tobacco users. Rather, it is likely to
exacerbate health-related inequalities by limiting smokers' access
to healthcare and inhibiting smoking cessation efforts in primary
care settings." 174 It may also be the case that social disparities
help explain why shame-based interventions are politically
feasible. Indeed, Bayer and Stuber have noted that states with
aggressive antismoking campaigns began to "embrace [ ] a
strategy of denormalization" only after "the social class
composition of smokers underwent a dramatic shift downward." 175
D. Egalitarian Anti-Healthism

on

In her scholarship on the Affordable Care Act's restrictions
and
employment
insurance
underwriting
health
172.
173.
174.
175.

Wiley Obesity, supra note 165, at 139.
Id.
Bell, supra note 19, at 795.
Bayer & Stuber, supranote 21, at 49.
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discrimination, Roberts expressly repurposed the term healthism
to describe "discrimination on the basis of health status."1 76
Working together, Roberts and Leonard add nuance, defining
healthism as "systematic differential treatment of unhealthy
individuals-individuals who have a sufficiently severe condition
that they or society deem undesirable-in a way that inflicts a
normative wrong."1 77
The healthism decried by Crawford,
Skrabanek, and others was an "ism" in the sense of communism
or capitalism. In contrast, Roberts and Leonard seek to establish
healthism among "other familiar 'isms,' such as racism, sexism,
ageism, and ableism." 178
Roberts and Leonard articulate "a theoretical framework for
understanding when differentiating on the basis of health is
acceptable and when such differentiation should constitute
legally restricted discrimination." 179 They articulate several
factors in their efforts to "grapple with the normative-wrong and
trait-versus-conduct elements of [their] healthism definition."18 0
Their framework is intended to provide a foundation for
"extending the [anti-healthism] project [from Roberts's initial
focus on health insurance and employment] into a variety of other
spheres, including health-care access, public health, reproductive
technology, the marketplace, and the judicial system." 18 1
Ultimately, their purpose is to "define a roadmap for
policymaking
that
promotes
health
without
unfairly
discriminating." 182

Even as they seek to extend their critique of healthism
beyond employment discrimination and risk-based insurance
underwriting, Roberts and Leonard continue to place theories of
discrimination at the center of their framework. They openly
struggle, however, with the traditional focus of antidiscrimination
176. Roberts (2012), supra note 23, at 1171. Roberts described previous uses of
the term as referring to "the shift in responsibility for health problems from the
individual to the state" involving "the government's promotion of coercive health

norms, and its attempts to impose lifestyle choices deemed 'healthy' on its citizens."
Id. This formulation does not quite capture Crawford's core concern that health
promotion activities in the 1970s reinforced a harmful notion of personal responsibility
that blamed individuals for their own health problems. It is more accurate as a
reading of Skrabanek's work, though I would describe his work as critiquing the shift
in authority over health-related behaviors from the individual to the state.
177. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 856.
178. Id. at 838.
179. Id. at 835.
180. Id. at 856.
181. Id. at 837.
182. Id. at 862.
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law on "distinctions between 'mutable' and 'immutable' traits"
based on "[t]he rationale . . . that individuals should not be
disadvantaged on the basis of traits that they did not choose, did
They note that
not cause, and cannot change." 183
"antidiscrimination law has moved beyond immutability" with
respect to characteristics like religion and sexual orientation on
the grounds that "such characteristics are very difficult, as a
practical matter, to change, or . . . are so fundamental to
personhood that 'it would be abhorrent for government to penalize
a person for refusing to change them."' 184 Ultimately, they rely on

expansion of antidiscrimination law beyond protection of
immutable traits to "carve out a set of health-related statuses,
traits, conditions, [and] conduct that should be protected from
disadvantage, regardless of voluntariness."1 85 They note that this
is "a very difficult line to draw." 186 The challenge for Roberts and

Leonard is that this "difficult line" is central to their project. On
one hand, their anti-healthism project depends on an
antidiscrimination norm that condemns at least some forms of
differentiation based on conduct and mutable traits. On the other
hand, the notion that "the law can appropriately incentivize
individuals to alter their 'bad' conduct or choices and gain the
privileges enjoyed by others who make 'good' choices" 187 is the
touchstone of their effort to save other forms of differentiation.
Roberts and Leonard offer two rubrics for distinguishing
8
between "'good' and 'bad' health-status differentiations."18
by
animus,"
"[i]s
driven
differentiation
Unacceptable
"[s]tigmatizes individuals unfairly, [p]unishes people for their
private conduct, [ ] impedes access to health care, [c]uts off
resources or otherwise limits the ability to adopt healthy life
choices, [p]roduces worse health outcomes, or [m]aintains or
increases existing disparities."1 89 In a rough mirror image of the
first rubric, acceptable differentiation is characterized by its
tendency to "[p]romote healthy decisionmaking, [fjacilitate
individual choices regarding health, [1]ower health risks, [1]ower
health-care costs, and/or [f]acilitate better health care and better

183. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 843.
184. Id. at 844 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J. concurring)).
185. Id. at 843.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 843.
188. Id. at 896.
189. Roberts & Leonard, supranote 23, at 895.
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health-care access."1 90 Together, the two rubrics emphasize the
importance of discriminatory intent and impact, as well as
consideration of health-related costs and benefits.
IV. ASSESSING TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION
The various tobacco denormalization interventions described
in Part II offer fertile ground for examining the nuanced (and notso-nuanced) differences among the four frameworks introduced in
Part III. For each intervention, I will briefly discuss legal
considerations before comparing and contrasting how the
intervention might be viewed from the perspective of libertarian
anti-healthism, health justice, and the Roberts and Leonard
All forms of tobacco
egalitarian anti-healthism principle.
denormalization are problematic from Skrabanek's and Epstein's
libertarian anti-healthism perspective, 9 1 but parsing what is
most objectionable about any given strategy from this perspective
is a worthwhile pursuit. Health justice and the Roberts and
Leonard anti-healthism principle provide more nuanced critiques
of tobacco denormalization, which deem some strategies
problematic and others acceptable.
A. Tobacco Taxes
New taxes may face political challenges, but so long as they
are adopted by the proper government body using prescribed
procedures, they are largely invulnerable to legal challenge.1 92
Courts give broad deference to the political branches with respect
to taxation, even in cases where the tax has an obvious regulatory
purpose. 193
If
Tobacco taxes can be justified in economic terms.
calculated correctly, taxes can force tobacco users to internalize
But
costs that would otherwise be imposed on others. 194

190. Id. at 895-96.
191. I will focus on Skrabanek and Epstein in particular because their work
shares an emphasis on liberty largely untempered by concerns about equality and
social justice. Other scholars (see, e.g., Crawford, supra note 140 at 368; Freeman,
supra note 141; Dworkin & Watts, supra note 140) have used the term healthism in
the sense that Skrabanek used it, but have cautioned against the neoliberal emphasis
on personal responsibility that Epstein and (to a lesser extent) Skrabanek have
embraced.

192. GoSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 279.
193. Id. (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1866)).
194. Id. at 276-78 (citing Adam J. Hoffer et al., Sin Taxes: Size, Growth, and
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whether
the
question
libertarians
economically-minded
externalities associated with tobacco use are overestimated. 195
They also point out that costs used to justify taxation and other
tobacco control measures are artificially induced by publicly
financed health care programs (for the elderly, disabled, and
poor), laws that prohibit private health insurers from charging
actuarially fair premiums, and other mechanisms that adopt a
needlessly collective approach to health-care financing.196
In addition to critiquing the economic unfairness of sin taxes,
libertarians also critique the signal they send about the
government's moralistic disapproval.
Roberts and Leonard do not discuss tobacco taxes directly,
but their discussion of the federal tax on artificial tanning services
provides a window into how they might view other public health
taxes.
Their approval of the tanning tax hinges on their
assessment that "people who use tanning beds have not been the
subject of widespread animus or stigma on par with smokers or
overweight people."1

97

Presumably, then, tobacco taxes are more

concerning from the egalitarian anti-healthist perspective.
From a health justice perspective, the most concerning

Creation of the Sindustry, MERCATUS CTR. (Feb. 5, 2013); see also William J.
Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities,62 AM. EcON. REV. 307, 308-09
(1972); James R. Hines, Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. EcON. PERSP. 49,
64 (2007).
195. Skrabanek (1992), supra note 145.
196. Epstein (2004), supra note 148, at 1463 ('Indeed today the major argument
for extensive regulation of individual health practices comes from the government's
role as the insurer of (first and) last resort . . . .

[T]he government . . . has no

willingness to impose explicit conditions that exclude people for dangerous habits (e.g.,
skydiving) or charge them differential rates for smoking or obesity . . . . [T]he best
course would be to weaken the public safety net that induces harmful individual
behaviors in the first event, and to replace it with a system of tailored disincentives
that do not encroach on individual liberty."); Richard A. Epstein, Subrogation, and
Insurance, with Special Reference to the Tobacco Litigation, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. , 49697 ("[G]overnments, both state and federal, have proved utterly incapable of
administering and controlling their Medicare and Medicaid budgets.... The more
inept the management of these programs, the more substantial the recoveries they . .
obtain from the tobacco companies for tobacco-related illnesses . . . . [I]t will . . . be

said that Medicare and Medicaid are different because federal obligations mandate
that states expend their resources to counteract the harmful effects of smoking....

The obligation . . . takes the form of another unfunded mandate. Surely the right
answer is for the states and the federal government to work their disagreements out
between themselves. It is not to export them onto tort defendants."). See also Lindsay
F. Wiley, Micah L. Bernian & Doug Blanke, Who's Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism
and Public Health in the Age of PersonalResponsibility, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS S88
(2013).
197. Roberts & Leonard, supranote 23, at 904.
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feature of tobacco taxes is not the government's promotion of a
particular notion of the good life. If the choice to disapprove of
tobacco use is made through fair and transparent democratic
procedures, it represents the prerogative of the community to
signal its values and promote its preferred way of life. The impact
of taxes on tobacco users as such is also unconcerning. On the
other hand, their regressive nature is problematic from a social
justice standpoint. 198
B. Product Regulation
Direct regulation of tobacco products as the agent of disease
is constitutionally permissible so long as it is rationally related to
the government's legitimate purpose of reducing tobacco
consumption. 199 It raises considerable concerns from a libertarian
anti-healthism standpoint, but is relatively unproblematic from
my health justice perspective or in terms of Roberts and Leonard's
anti-healthism principle because it does not affect the social
status of tobacco users in any way.
The fact that the most prominent regulation of tobacco
products is focused on restricting the use of flavorings that
increase the appeal and perceived appropriateness of the products
for children raises an interesting issue for libertarian
antihealthism. Are government efforts to promote an "ideology"
of healthy living more or less objectionable when they target
minors? The typical libertarian argument against government
paternalism toward children is that it unnecessarily (maybe even
harmfully) supplants parental responsibility. That argument has
less force with respect to tobacco given that few, if any, parents
would express a preference for their children to use tobacco.
Perhaps the more attractive argument is that efforts to protect
children (who have limited autonomy anyway) also affect adults
(whose autonomy should be paramount). While the candy-and
dessert-flavored tobacco products permitted under current law
are not favored by the majority of adults, some adults do choose
to use them. 200 Thus, there is reason to believe that adult tobacco
198. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 278-79.
199. Because distinctions between tobacco products and other products are not
constitutionally suspect, the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection and due
process require only that the regulation of tobacco products be rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose and reducing tobacco use is widely recognized as
legitimate. See supraPart III.A.
200. See Wayne & Connolly, supra note 50, at i34-i35 (Table 2) (highlighting the
"significant appeal" of flavored products for 18-24-year-old smokers).

242

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18.2

users are harmed by the flavor bans that are in effect.
Roberts and Leonard do not address tobacco product
regulation, but their discussion of the portion rule for sugary
drinks adopted by the New York City Board of Health in 2012
(and invalidated by the state's supreme court on state
administrative law grounds shortly thereafter) is instructive.
They note that "[w]hile the Big Gulp ban might promote healthy
decision-making by creating incentives to reduce consumption of
sugary beverages . . . it does not clearly produce positive effects,
including positively impacting the range of available choices,
lowering health risks or costs, or facilitating better health
care." 201 The fact that their analysis is reduced to a calculation of

the likely effectiveness of this regulation of products and retailers
suggests that their egalitarian anti-healthism principle is not
doing much work here that could not be done as well or better by
widely accepted public health ethics frameworks or the
administrative law requirements that eventually spelled the
intervention's demise in the courts. 202
From a health justice perspective, product regulations are a
crucial component of the facilitating social-ecological strategies
that should take precedence over individually targeted behavioral
strategies. The problem with flavor bans from a health justice
standpoint is that they do not go far enough. The fact that
menthol-flavored products, which the industry has used to target
Black consumers for decades, enjoy protected status under federal
law is evidence of exactly the kind of racial and economic bias that
health justice demands attention to.
C. Counter-Marketing
Government sponsored speech does not raise constitutional
concerns, even when it is funded by taxes paid by the industry it
seeks to denigrate. 203 Counter-marketing campaigns that
denigrate the tobacco industry may be problematic from the
libertarian anti-healthism standpoint, while those that seek to
denigrate tobacco users raise concerns under all of the extralegal
201. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 904.
202. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the
Law: The Normative Impact of Product ConfigurationBans, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1877,
1888 (2014); Lindsay F. Wiley, Deregulation,Distrust, and Democracy: State and Local
Action to Ensure EquitableAccess to Healthy, Sustainably-producedFood, 41 AM. J. L.
MED. 284 (2015).
203. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 142 (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Shewry, 423 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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frameworks discussed above.
From
the
libertarian
anti-healthism
perspective,
counter-marketing campaigns that focus on tobacco users would
seem to be a prime example of government endorsement of a
Skrabanek and
tobacco-free lifestyle as socially desirable.
Crawford repeatedly expressed concerns that healthism was
inappropriately tinged by the supposed moral superiority of
individuals who adopt healthy behaviors. Even campaigns that
focus solely on demonizing the tobacco industry are probably
objectionable to libertarians, though some ultimately defer to
government's freedom to express its own point of view in the
marketplace of ideas as a less restrictive alternative to
advertising and product regulations, which they find far more
abhorrent.
Counter-marketing campaigns that target the tobacco
industry and tobacco products are generally consistent with the
health justice perspective, especially those that focus on revealing
and remedying industry practices that target racial, ethnic, and
sexual minorities. Counter-marketing campaigns that associate
tobacco use with negative cosmetic and social consequences
should be carefully assessed, but are largely acceptable. The bias
that they generate against smokers does not amount to true
stigma. As Burris notes:
One could argue that smokers are not really
relegated to a "them" status, that smoking does not
supplant all other traits and is not automatically or
durably associated with a range of negative
stereotypes. Or one could argue that it satisfies all
the criteria of stigma in a formal way, but that in
none of the domains is the effect serious enough to
rise to the level of stigma. 204
More systematically, Bayer has argued that tobacco
denormalization involves "marginalization that can be shed," that
"permits, even [ ] as its goal, the reintegration of those who have
been shamed." 205 Thus, it may be appropriate if its public health
benefits outweigh its costs.

206

Roberts and Leonard do not address counter-marketing

204. Id. at 187.
205. Bayer (2008), supranote 34, at 470.
206. Id.
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campaigns, but they might view campaigns focusing on
undesirable social and cosmetic consequences of tobacco use with
suspicion. Does the fact that such campaigns are less common
with respect to other risky activities (such as adventure sports or
alcohol use) indicate that they are prompted, at least in part, by
animus against tobacco users? I think not, but I also disagree
with Roberts and Leonard's similar assertion about the role of
animus against smokers as a motivation for employment
I agree that such campaigns deploy social
discrimination.
shaming, but unlike Roberts and Leonard, I feel it is important to
distinguish between acceptable uses of shame and those that
exacerbate true stigma.
D. Advertising Restrictions
The Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence regarding First
Amendment protection for commercial speech has put advertising
Thus far, federal
restrictions at risk in recent years. 207
restrictions on tobacco advertising have largely been upheld. 208
But some state and local restrictions have been invalidated by the
courts on the grounds that they impermissibly infringe upon the
First Amendment rights of tobacco companies and sellers. 209
Evidence regarding the efficacy of advertising restrictions is
Under the
crucial to litigation over their constitutionality.
heightened standard of review the courts now apply to restrictions
on commercial advertising, 210 regulators must establish that each
restriction directly advances an important government interest.
Few judges question the importance of reducing tobacco
consumption, 21 1 but many are skeptical about the incremental,
population-level effects of restrictions. 212
Interestingly, while advertising restrictions are the most
problematic denormalization strategy from a constitutional
standpoint, they are in many ways less concerning than other
strategies from the standpoint of the extralegal frameworks
presented in this article. Perhaps surprisingly, Epstein has noted
exactly this contradiction, in the context of a case upholding state

207.

GosTIN & WrLEY, supra note 36, at 453-57.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 455 (discussing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 456 (discussing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
212. Id. at 454-56.
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restrictions on gambling advertising:
It is better that people not gamble, not only for their
own personal character, but also for the corrosive
effect gambling has on family and business
obligations. Nonetheless, it is just too costly to try
to control gambling by criminal sanctions. Better
therefore to legalize the "disfavored" activity, which
can then be taxed to keep participation within
reason. Disfavored activities, moreover, need not
be treated like all other business activities.
Advertisement stimulates business, so it might be
proper for a state to decide that, while it should not
ban gambling, it should nonetheless moderate its
growth by banning advertising. Surely if the issue
were the legalization of marijuana and other drugs,
a respectable argument could be made to allow
their sale, subject to a general tax and to
prohibitions or restrictions on advertising, which,
because of advertising's public visibility, should be
reasonably easy to enforce.
In effect we have
adopted such a strategy with respect to cigarettes,
which are sold, heavily taxed, and subject to
advertisement restrictions, at least on television
and radio. 213
Roberts and Leonard do not take a particular position on
advertising restrictions, but applying the factors they articulate,
one could easily defend such restrictions as "[p]romot[ing] healthy
decisionmaking, . . . [1]ower[ing] health risks, [and] [1]ower[ing]
health-care costs." 2 14

Advertising restrictions do not draw any

obvious distinction based on health behavior, nor does this appear
to be an intervention that is "driven by animus, [s]tigmatizes
individuals unfairly, [p]unishes people for their private conduct,
[i]mpedes access to health care, [c]uts off resources or otherwise
limits the ability to adopt healthy life choices, [p]roduces worse
existing
or [m]aintains or increases
health outcomes,
disparities." 215 Advertising restrictions are also appropriate from
a health justice perspective. They alter the social and cultural
213. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4, 65-66 (1988).
214. Id. at 895-96.
215. Id. at 895.
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environment in which choices about tobacco use are made, rather
than targeting individuals directly.
E. Warning Mandates
All four frameworks can be used to draw a rough distinction
between mandates to provide straightforward information about
product ingredients and the health risks associated with tobacco
use and those that associate tobacco use with negative cosmetic
The Supreme Court's Zauderer
and social consequences.
precedent carves out an exception to heightened review for
mandates to disclose "purely factual and uncontroversial
information." 216 How far this exception extends is a matter of
ongoing disagreement among the lower courts. 217 Roberts and
Leonard characterize public health interventions that "educate or
. . . better inform the public of the risks" 2 1 8 as socially beneficial
and therefore acceptable. They do not address graphic warnings
that (like counter-marketing campaigns) associate tobacco use
with socially and cosmetically undesirable consequences, but (as
with counter-marketing) one could imagine that labels emphasizing bad breath or impotence would meet their working definition
of stigmatizing. They could also be concerned about the possible
role of animus in prompting these kinds of government-mandated
messages. From a health justice standpoint, warning mandates
of all types are acceptable to the extent that tobacco use is not
truly the object of stigma. If, however, warning labels were
adopted that sought to associate tobacco use with other
stigmatized traits, such as gender nonconformance, that could be
problematic.
F. Smoke-Free Laws
Bayer and Burris both focus considerable attention on
smoke-free laws. Consistent with the notion that denormalization
of tobacco use is not identity spoiling and encourages
reintegration, rather than permanent marginalization, Bayer
concludes that laws prohibiting smoking in public places involve
"segregation that is demeaning but not degrading," and
216. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
217. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 449-52.
218. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 893 (critiquing excise taxes on sugary
drinks and artificial tanning services for failing to educate or better inform the public
of health risks).
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separation that is "temporary rather than enduring," 219
The impact of smoke-free housing laws, particularly as
applied to publicly assisted housing, on those who are unable to
quit smoking is concerning from the health justice perspective
even if (as Burris argues) tobacco use is not the object of true
stigma. Such laws adopt a behavioral approach-punishing
individual smokers without necessarily making it easier to quittoward current smokers. Roberts and Leonard express similar
concerns, noting that "for any paternalistic policy designed to
encourage healthy decision-making to be fair and effective,
individuals must have the ability to actually make better
decisions [and t]here are good reasons to doubt that that is always
the case." 220

On the other hand, unlike either version of anti-healthism,
health justice demands attention to the needs of nonsmokers, as
well as smokers, particularly with respect to low-income
housing. 221 Smoke-free laws represent a social-ecological strategy
with respect to those who are trying to quit or have not yet started
smoking.
They alter the social environment in a housing
development, reducing exposure to smoking as a normal activity
and reinforcing nonsmoking as the dominant social norm. A
commitment to health justice-which emphasizes the priority of
facilitating social-ecological interventions over individually-

219. Bayer, supra note 34, at 470.
220. Roberts & Leonard, supranote 23, at 893.
221. ChangeLab Solutions, Smokefree Housing Ordinance:A Model California
Ordinance Regulating Smoking in Multi-Unit Residences (June 2015),
http://www.changelabsolutions.org/publications/model-ord-smokefree-housing
[https://perma.ccfVS47-92RS] ("By adopting laws eliminating exposure to secondhand
smoke in people's homes, communities can ensure that smoke free living is not a
luxury but instead made available to all residents, regardless of their economic means,
race, or ethnicity."); Amy K. 01fene, OfAsthma andAshtrays: Examining the Rights of
and Exploring Ways to Protect Maine Tenants Living in Multi-Unit Rental Housing
Who are Involuntarily Exposed to Secondhand Tobacco Smoke in Their Homes, 66
MAINE L. REV. 292, 294 (2013) (noting that "72% of Maine adults choose to ban
smoking in their own homes, but only 47% of Maine tenants report living in a rental
building that prohibits smoking. Thus, not surprisingly, although the majority of
Maine households have adopted voluntary smoke-free policies, low-income individuals
continue to be exposed at much higher rates than the general population.");
Non-Smokers' Rights Association, Smoking & Health Action Foundation, Smoke-Free
Affordable Housing: Picking on Poor People or a Case for Social Justice? (2010),
http://www.smokefreehousingny.org/wp-content/uploads/Case-for-Social-Justice.pdf

[https://perma.cc/R93N-P8EA] ("there remains an acute shortage of multi-unit
buildings for people who need or want to live smoke-free. This is the case for
Canadians seeking market rate rental housing, and especially so for those who cannot
afford market rate and must rely upon affordable housing.").
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suggest that
targeted behavioral interventionS 222 -would
may be
facilities
housing
public
in
smoking
on
prohibitions
to
interventions
supportive
by
acceptable if they are preceded
support.
social
ensure adequate access to cessation services and
Roberts and Leonard's focus on protecting "meaningful choices"

223

raises intriguing possibilities in this regard, but it is not yet
sufficiently fleshed out to provide a useful framework for
supporting a smoke-free ban if adequate supports for smokers are
in place while rejecting it if they are not.
G. Discrimination against Tobacco Users
Permitting or encouraging private discrimination against
tobacco users-whether in employment, insurance, or housingwould seem to be the most problematic form of tobacco
denormalization from the standpoint of all four of the frameworks
presented here. But the devil is in the details.
From a legal standpoint, firing, or refusing to hire an
employee based on off-the-job tobacco use is prohibited in about
half of states. 224 These antidiscrimination laws are justified in
terms of egalitarian and libertarian concerns. On the other hand,
employer-sponsored wellness programs, which may create a
hostile work environment for employees whose behavior or status
designates them as unhealthy, are not only permitted, but
encouraged by federal regulatory exemptions and grant
programs.225
Roberts and Leonard argue that refusing to hire or firing an
employee for tobacco use is unacceptably healthist because it
"classifjies] and subordinate[s] . . . employees based on legal
226
Pointing to
conduct that tends to correlate with poor health."

the "rarity of similar lifestyle discrimination policies targeting
alcohol consumption or high-risk recreational activities (e.g.,
mountain climbing, racecar driving, scuba-diving, spelunking),
which may present similar or greater threats to health and
productivity," they suggest that these laws may be based on
animus (in addition to rational considerations regarding
increased health care and productivity costs borne by

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Wiley Obesity, supra note 165, at 131.
Roberts & Leonard, supranote 23, at 894.
Wiley Obesity, supra note 165, at 181.
Wiley Access to Health Care, supra note 109, at 664.
Roberts & Leonard, supranote 23.
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employers). 227 They also suggest that "hiring bans ...
stigmatize
nicotine users . . . by reducing them to [a] single characteristic
[ ]-. . . nicotine use. . . -without regard for their other attributes
that could make them good employees." 228 They note that bans
on off-the-job smoking "denies . . . wages to pay for health care
out-of-pocket, as well as the benefits of employer-provided
ironically-frequently
programs,
which-perhaps
wellness
include tobacco-cessation" and thus, "cut off resources and limit a
person's ability to adopt healthier life choices." 229 Finally, they
note that
Shutting nicotine users . . . out of employment may
paradoxically produce a healthier workforce but a
less healthy overall population. In addition, because
people of color, people with disabilities, and lowerincome individuals are more likely to use nicotine ...
nicotine-use . . . bans disproportionately affect these
groups'[,] potentially perpetuating existing health
230
disparities.
Roberts and Leonard also express discomfort with insurance
premium surcharges for tobacco users, noting that lawmakers
might allow the surcharges "as an incentive for tobacco users to
quit," but "instead smokers faced with medium or high penalties
23
chose to forgo coverage altogether to avoid elevated premiums." 1
On the other hand, Roberts and Leonard hold up employersponsored wellness programs that offer rewards for participating
in a smoking cessation program as "an easy case of a non-healthist
Their
policy that discriminates based on health status." 232
wellness
programs
workplace
the
notion
that
approval turns on
"typically offer a range of supportive services, funded fully or
partially by the employer, including individual coaching, support
groups, web-based tracking and support, and smoking cessation
drugs." 233 They caution that such programs "should be carefully
designed to avoid stigmatizing participants," 234 but the strategies

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 896.
Id at 897.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 894.
Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 900.
Id.at 900-01.
Id. at 901.
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they suggest for avoiding stigma-"requir[ing] employers to
permit workers time away from work duties to participate or
publically recognized quitting milestones to the employee
community" 235-bear little relationship to health-related stigma,
as sociologists have described it. Elsewhere, they note that "it
remains to be seen whether [workplace wellness programs that
rely on biometric screenings to assess weight, blood pressure,
cholesterol, etc.] actually lower costs, reduce risks, or produce
better health outcomes," cautioning that "perhaps the law should
be agnostic with respect to such initiatives, at least until
empirical evidence is clearer." 236 While supportive, participation-

based smoking cessation programs get their seal of approval,
other workplace wellness programs run afoul of their egalitarian
anti-healthist principle.
The health justice approach, informed by the work of Burris
and Bayer on health-related stigma would question, in the first
instance, whether tobacco use is the object of true stigma (as
discussed above). Where true stigma is at issue-as I have argued
is the case for wellness policies that target individuals based on
body mass index-the strategies suggested by Roberts and
Leonard do not respond to health justice concerns. Time away
from work to change the targeted behavior (e.g., to attend weight
loss or smoking cessation seminars) would do little to combat
stigma. Public recognition of those who have disavowed the
targeted status or behavior and may actually exacerbate the
stigma surrounding it.237
Assessing workplace wellness programs from the libertarian
anti-healthist perspective is more difficult. Roberts describes
employer-sponsored wellness programs as healthist in the
"traditional" (what I refer to as libertarian) sense. 238 However,
Epstein (whom I classify as a libertarian anti-healthist) has
written favorably of "differential premiums for smokers and nonsmokers" which "would create incentives to reduce the level of
smoking, and ... reduce any implicit subsidy that nonsmokers are
forced to pay for the benefit of smokers." 239 More generally, he
has argued that if "more health costs [are] privately borne, most
individuals will take more care to avoid illness and injury than

235.
236.
237.
note 109,
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 903.
Wiley Obesity, supra note 165; see also Wiley Access to Health Care, supra
at 640.
Roberts (2012), supra note 23, at 1171.
Epstein (1997), supra note 142, at 498.
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before." 240 Skrabanek, who died in 1994, did not have occasion to
comment on such programs, but could conceivably have taken
issue with corporate nannies just as he did with government
nannies.
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
At its core, the egalitarian anti-healthism principle put
forward by Roberts and Leonard is an antidiscrimination
principle. The various factors they use to distinguish good
health-related
discrimination
from
bad
health-status
discrimination boil down to consideration of whether there is
discriminatory (or animus-based) intent and whether there is a
discriminatory (or disparate) impact, mixed with a little costbenefit analysis. 241 Their groundbreaking work evaluating the
discriminatory intent and impact of interventions purportedly
aimed at improving health provides fertile ground or further
exploration.
It offers an egalitarian counterweight to the
libertarian critiques that have dominated discussions of public
health policy.
On the other hand, the egalitarian anti-healthism principle
is insufficient, by itself, to inform a thorough evaluation of some
kinds of public health intervention. The limitations of the antidiscrimination principle are the subject of voluminous literature.
Barring animus as a motivation for state action has not been a
terribly successful strategy for policing the boundaries of
Animus is notoriously difficult for
government authority.
challengers to prove. Disparate impact may be susceptible to
objective proof, but many judges and lawmakers have deemed its
use as a legal standard over-inclusive. 242 Cost-benefit analysis is
well established as a tool for assessing the acceptability of
regulatory interventions. Public health ethics and statutory
regulatory impact analysis requirements already provide ample
support for assessing the likely impact of a public health
intervention on health outcomes, health care access, and costs.
The antidiscrimination principle put forward by Roberts
works well when it is applied to employers' decisions about whom
to hire and fire and insurer's decisions about whom to insure and
at what rate. It accurately describes the ACA's efforts to
240. Richard A. Epstein, Living Dangerously: In Defense of Mortal Peril, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REV. 909, 918 (1998).
241. Weeks & Leonard, supra note 23, at 862.
242. Id. at 857.
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constrain risk-based underwriting. In turn, the ACA's constraints
on risk-based underwriting increase the motivation for employers
to engage in health-status discrimination-in their hiring and
disciplinary practices, and by using workplace wellness programs
to create a workplace environment that is hostile to unhealthy
Roberts's proposal that existing prohibitions on
employees.
discrimination by employers and insurers should be broadened
and new prohibitions should be adopted to protect individuals
from discrimination on the basis of health status adds
considerable value to ongoing debates about why certain health
conditions should trigger a mutual aid response and how far that
mutual aid response should extend.
But anti-healthism as antidiscrimination may be too
simplistic a principle to provide useful insights regarding more
complex matters such as taxes, advertising restrictions, and
counter-marketing campaigns targeting products and services
that have deleterious health effects, and prohibition of smoking
(which is harms the health of bystanders as well as users) in
These policies may contribute to social
designated places.
exclusion of people whose conduct is perceived as unhealthy 243 but
it is difficult to prove that they are motivated by animus toward
particular health-related behaviors. The impact of these policies
on health can be assessed individually (e.g. a smoker who spends
significant income on cigarettes because he cannot or will not quit
has less income to spend on other goods and services that could be
beneficial for his health). But as a policy matter, surely their
effects should be assessed in the aggregate, at the population level
(e.g., the deleterious impact of cigarette taxes on a tobacco user
who cannot or will not quit is outweighed by the positive health
impact of reducing the prevalence of smoking).
These
interventions may have a disparate impact on people of color,
people who live in low-income households, and people with low
formal educational attainment. 244 But, as Roberts and Leonard
point out, those effects are addressed through principles that
reject bias based on race, ethnicity, income, and education. 245

243. Notably, Roberts repeatedly distinguished between discrimination (a term
she used to describe healthism) and social exclusion (a term she used to describe
ableism) in her initial work applying her anti-healthism principle in the context of
employment and health insurance determinations. See Roberts (2012), supranote 23,
at 1171, 1174.
244. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 852.
245. Id. at 856 ("Concluding that lifestyle discrimination, at least with respect to
nicotine use and obesity, is normatively wrong primarily because it has a disparate
impact on historically disadvantaged populations does not require ... a new protected
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Other frameworks, built on the general principles of public health
ethics, are better suited to assessing the role that bias plays in the
development and implementation of public health interventions
and the distribution of benefits and burdens (including social
exclusion) associated with those interventions.
The Roberts and Leonard anti-healthism framework neglects
analysis of the nature of the health-related conduct, trait, or
status at issue and its relationship to individual identity. Unlike
frameworks developed by Bayer, Stuber, Burris, and others, the
Roberts and Leonard framework does not assess whether
smoking, consumption of sugary drinks, rejection of vaccines,
obesity, HIV-status, and other health-related behaviors and traits
are-like religion and sexual orientation-"characteristics [that]
are very difficult, as a practical matter, to change, or . . . are so
fundamental to personhood that it would be abhorrent for
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them."2" 6

category for the unhealthy. From this perspective, healthism is simply a new form of
discrimination against already protected (to varying degrees of scrutiny) groups.").
Ultimately, however, they conclude that protections against people who are unhealthy,
while more difficult to justify, are necessary to fully address their concerns.
246. Id. at 844 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J. concurring)).

